1947-04-15, #3: Doctors' Trial (afternoon)

AFTERNOON SESSION (The hearing reconvened at 1330 hours, 15 April 1947.)

THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.

DR. FRIEDRICH HIELSCHER — Resumed DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued)

BY DR. WEISGERBER (Counsel for the Defendant Sievers):

Q: Witness, it seems to me to be desirable for you to give to the Tribunal a very short description of the political phenomenon which we described as the German resistance movement. Could you clarify this phenomenon in a few short sentences?

A: In order to understand it one has to imagine the situation in which everybody in the country found himself whenever he wanted to be active in any way. One has to imagine that parents couldn't speak to their children because the child did not know how to lie in such a manner that the attitude of the parents did not become apparent to their teachers. One must imagine that every neighbor was in a position to observe every errand, everyone who spoke out of place was sure to find an enemy who would denounce him. One must imagine that ever since 1939 we knew that prisoners in order to make them testify were thrown into a bath of water wit 80 degrees heat and the skin was peeled off their bodies. One must imagine that none of us could be sure that he would be able to keep quiet and what he would testify under torture, or under the pressure of any which was introduced to him. That is to say, it was quite out of the question to get together in large meetings. It was impossible to carry on any open propaganda.

In Stockholm I was asked, "Why don't you speak publicly?" Well, it just wasn't possible, it was absurd. Only when one considers that situation one can imagine how one could work against the Party. There were little cells, very tiny groups, where the rank and file man didn't know what the other one was doing, where one group was not allowed to know what the other group was doing.

If one would be discovered it could betray the other. A system of buckheads was necessary, if one buckhead was full the other one had to be water-tight. And this is the only way in which it was possible for a few people, who knew one another before 1935, to get together under a very calculated circumstances. One always had to know under what pretext one had met and what one would say if somebody was suddenly to interrupt. How much could the wife know? What would the wife have to testify in case she was asked had she met a certain number of these men before? If so, how long had she known them? Under what position did she know them? After leaving one would have to arrange what the subject of conversation had been. I think that this is a picture of the atmosphere in which we had to work. At the beginning of the Nazi regime a large part of the circles and groups upon which one relied were eliminated, they had been put into concentration camps, some of them had been killed, one didn't know how these people in the concentration camps were guarded, and it took years before one could once more establish who really was left, who kept quiet, and upon whom one could therefore rely. Only after years one could put his head out of one's camouflaged position, and could find out what one could do and how one could meet one's friends. The next difficulty was that none of the political groups could act unless there was a cooperation of parts of the Armed Forces. Himmler certainly wouldn't have left if one just talked to him, and upon that depended the slowness of the entire work.

Q: Now, I think it would he desirable that you describe to the Tribunal how you cooperated with circles that were of your opinion, how you established contact with them, and to what extent your collaboration was possible with other groups?

A: Our group maintained contact and cooperated with Socialists; I mention Dr. Reichwein, Dr. Topf, who was here before, and Dr. Haubach. Then there was the young conservative group of Graf Friedrich von der Schulenburg, the Catholic circles around the Freiherr [Barron] Friedrich von Luening, who was one of the most courageous and noble men I ever got to know. There was the group around August Wenig, the military group around Count Stauffenberg, and a number of clergymen.

Q: Was there cooperation between you and these groups which you just mentioned?

A: It would be best to describe how we actually met. I met Freiherr Luening and became acquainted with him in 1940 because he was the commander of a reserve battalion ER-9. He was supposed to help me to recruit a Jewish friend under a false name into this battalion. At that time I was currently active in the questions of what was to be done later, and in that connection I was in contact with August Wenig. It was in the Spring of 1940 when Luening told me, "You know Fritz Schulenburg!" I vaguely remembered having seen him in 1932, 1928. A few hours later August Wenig told me the same thing and both told me that Schulenburg would come at night when darkness had fallen. He told me, "You know who recommended me; well how do we kill the pig?" Thereupon I said, "That is a reasonable basis for conversation; how about the Generals?" Then opinions were exchanged as to what military opinions I saw, what military opinions he saw, and the next question was if the morale of the country was ripe enough. Schulenburg, as a vice president or whatever he was, could not travel around the country very easily, that is, apart from his official trips, while I was getting around the country, and the question came up, "What does the mass of the population think?"

That is just one example. I don't want to tell many such examples and this is how conversations were carried out with a number of these people.

Everyone exchanged information about their particular groups; nobody asked where that information came from, nobody mentioned any names, except when it was ascertained in the case of any such information that it must originate from that source. Then one communicated only by using a formula, very seldom was the real name used. Telephones had to be disconnected and it was necessary to look outside the window to ascertain if anyone was on the street. We found out through a member of our organization in what manner a hidden microphone could be built into the wall, the flat was searched carefully, and this is the way we worked.

Q: What did Sievers do in order to further the activities of your organization?

A: For instance, he took care of supplying all information which was of importance. He told us what troops of the Waffen SS were in Germany during the war. He gave us fake official trips and he worked out a plan for an assassination, which was to be carried through by our group in case the generals plan did not come off. We all thought it was not safe to rely on the generals. In March of 1944 Werner Haften told me by order of Stauffenberg that one would have to take into account the fact that the generals would have to be moved into action by a certain assassination and everyone was to make his own preparations, in case he had any, in such a manner as if he was the only one active. That was the situation in March of 1944. We worked out a substantial plan to remove, if possible, Himmler and Hitler simultaneously, but in case of doubt Himmler himself. We were of a completely different opinion there than the other groups.

Q: What concrete preliminary work was done for the assassination in your group?

A: Sievers was the only one in our group who came into question regarding that assassination because he was the only one so close to Himmler. He was therefore assigned this task and we worked out this matter as far as the detailed plan was concerned; all that was necessary now was to press the button.

Q: And for what period of time was this assassination intended?

A: We started our preparations in the year of 1943 and at the earliest at the end of 1943 could we have started. Then we finally thought of the middle of 1944 because Schulenburg and Luening told me that the generals would be ready at around that period of time.

Q: Well, an assassination is a matter for quick decision. Is it not true, therefore, that all these long preparations are rather surprising that you are telling us about?

A: The following would have to be taken into consideration. Around Himmler and Hitler there was a strong guard, a strong ring of guards, though which none could get unless he was carefully searched and checked. Secondly, and that I already emphasized, one did not have to be quite sure that the generals would carry out that assassination but one had to be sure that a sufficient number of generals were ready to remove the N.S. system immediately after the assassination, for a elimination of just these two people themselves would have no political purpose whatsoever. We did not intend to carry out a Putsch but we intended to remove a political system, a political order, and for that reason we had to wait until the situation became right and the generals were ready.

Q: Now, the question crops up whether these plans for the assassination of Hitler and Himmler were only in your fantasy, or the fantasy of your collaborators, or was there any real basis or concrete preparation for such assassination?

A: I already said that the preparations had been worked out to the detailed technical point insofar as the assembly location, the shooting, etc. were concerned.

Q: And who would have assassinated Himmler and Hitler?

A: Sievers was to do that and a few young men belonging to my organization.

Q: And why was it in effect not carried out?

A: After the Stauffenberg assassination had failed, the Wehrmacht circles that came into question were eliminated by Himmler and therefore it was no longer possible to remove that system.

The only consequence of any attempted assassination would have been — since the foreign political situation would not have changed, the only consequence would have been here that the people would have said again. "This is the stab in the hack for the victorious front-line."

Q: What did Sievers do to further your activity in addition to what you have already said?

A: He, for instance, supported my representative, Arnold Deutelmoser when he was put on the list of those who were to be removed under the pretext of the assassination which took place in Munich at the Buergerbraue. He also protected Bomas who was working in the Netherlands. He protected Dr. Schuettelkopf whom we had sent into the RSHA and it was possible for him in turn to send me to Sweden. He saved Niels Bohr, Professor Seyb of Oslo University, and he saved a number of Norwegian students, etc.

Q: Do you know that Sievers informed you about Himmler's double-play in the case of the minister, Popitz, and that as a consequence he saved that entire group against measures by Himmler?

A: Yes. The following thing happened. One day Sievers approached me and said that I had just heard Himmler say in a close circle how he ridiculed an attempt on the part of Popitz. He said that Minister Popitz with the mediation of the lawyer Lampe had approached Himmler and tried to persuade him to bring about a change of the National Socialist system, perhaps by removing Hitler. He said Himmler thought it was very funny that these men had so little sense as to think of him in that connection. Thank God one could enter negotiations with them because it was sure that nobody was behind these people in the country, but it did seem that these gentlemen had many foreign political relationships and it would be advisable to find out what in effect was behind it all, and it would, therefore, be advisable to enter into negotiations with them. We were quite surprised about the naive attitude shown by Himmler, and I sent Deutelmoser to Reichwein with whom I knew he had connections with Popitz.

In that way Popitz was warned. Reichwein was so surprised and hardly wanted to believe that situation.

I was asked to participate in a conference, and Reichwein after having convinced himself that all of this was true, promised to warn all of the gentlemen concerned in Berlin and then asked Deutelmoser, who was to go to Norway shortly thereafter to notify Reichwein's friend, Stelzer, the present Minister President of Schleswig-Holstein, in order to see that he, too, took the necessary precautionary measures. In this way we hoped that a number of these people had actually been saved. Popitz, however, himself was careless and was captured.

Q: This conspiracy could not have been carried out unless you had the necessary financial means at your disposal. How did you get these means?

A: Everyone of our people, be it man or woman, had agreed to give up ten percent of their monthly income for that legal work. Many gave a substantially larger sum.

Q: How about Sievers?

A: Sievers gave more than he had to.

Q: Do you know the case of the three hundred Norwegian students who on the basis of Sievers' intervention were released from the concentration camp Buchenwald?

A: Yes. Terboven, or some other official in Norway disliked some demonstration which occurred there, and as a result arrested three hundred students. Through some dark channels they were brought into the concentration at Buchenwald.

Sievers found out about that, and if I remember correctly, he was in a position to see to it that these students be released from the concentration camp using Himmler's Nordic ideas.

Q: In that case you think that Sievers' activity was substantially important for your resistance movement?

A: Yes. That was true of my organization, for he protected and covered me as its chief, and, secondly, as far as I know, he was the only man belonging to any resistance movement who went as close as he to the Reichsfuehrer-SS. If any other group would have brought any such information as he did, I would have noticed it that it could have only come from the same source.

Q: Witness, I shall have a document handed to you which was submitted by the Prosecution. This is Document NO-975, Prosecution Exhibit 479. It is a letter sent by Sievers to Dr. Hirt. Would you please look at that letter?

A: Yes.

Q: This letter contains a tone of voice which seems to indicate that he tried to cover Dr. Hirt's activity. Dr. Hirt was working in the Anatomical Institute of the Strassburg University. I assume that for reasons which we shall mention later that you know Hirt's name. How do you explain that tone in this letter?

A: I think that this is very proper and praiseworthy. I would have thought it very foolish of Sievers if he adopted any other tone in any of his official correspondence. It was his task to say "yes" but act in a negative way. There couldn't have appeared any pretense of any disapproval on his part. The more active one had to be in an anti-National Socialist way, the more he had to speak for National Socialism.

Q: I shall now turn to another complex of questions. Sievers is indicted in this trial to have participated in a number of crimes. Did Sievers at any time tell you about the so-called research assignments of Dr. Rascher and Dr. Hirt, who was just mentioned? These more experiments carried out in the concentration camps.

A: Sievers, as far as I remember, came to me in the year 1942 and told me very excitedly that Himmler in his desire to extend the Ahnenerbe [Ancestral Heritage] Society had embarked on the thought of placing experiments on human beings under the work of the Ahnenerbe Society. He said that he did not succeed in frustrating that. He said that he had no desire whatsoever to participate in these horrible acts and asked me what to do. At that time we considered this horrible situation very thoroughly and thought of what we could do. It was quite clear to us what the SS intended here, and it was questionable whether responsibility could be assumed for any such acts, whether it would be advisable to be the instrument of Himmler if he embarked on any such acts, measures where human beings were degraded to the level of insects.

The following considerations proved to be decisive for us: if Sievers would leave, not one person, not one object of these experiments would be saved. In case Sievers stayed there as a technical secretary, he could throw sand into that machinery and could, perhaps, be in a position to save somebody. In addition, the entire plan and the entire overthrow of the Party stood or fell with Sievers' staying at his post. The experiments on human beings were only part of this horrible Party system, and one had to concentrate on the decisive points in order to finally remove everything, and, as I have said before, there was no other way into the staff of the Reichsfuehrer-SS.

We, therefore, summarized in case Sievers resigned because of that case, it was sure that he would be eliminated and probably that would also be true of all the people he had ever entrusted with a research assignment, and everything that we had done so far would be lost in case he left, and if anyone was to be saved at all, he could only be saved by Sievers remaining at his post.

Q: If I have understood you correctly, Sievers at first wanted to resign from his position as Reich business manager of the Ahnenerbe?

A: Yes, that is correct.

Q: Did Sievers approve of these arguments which you and your friends put forward in favor of his staying with the Reich Fuehrer SS as the Reich business manager of the Ahnenerbe? Did he do it immediately or only after trying to persuade him for some time?

A: This took a number of days, because Sievers, according to his nature, was softer than many of us and did not want to agree with us. We finally had to appeal to his sense of duty and persuade him that he had to do it and that was the only way out.

Q: Among other matters, it was considered that by Sievers remaining at his post, there would be a possibility of mitigating these horrible experiments.

A: The chance wasn't very great but we were convinced that his world be the only way possible, if at all. Then it could only be done in that manner. If I may say so, this was such a horrible situation that we always had to come back to it and we were damned lucky at least to have the hope to save a number of people. Other opponents of SS system have told me about similar dilemmas which were just as difficult, and where the alternative was yet more horrible, and where persons, according to my belief and knowledge, acted correctly, and if the Tribunal would permit me I could relate a few almost incredible situations which were even worse.

THE PRESIDENT: In what connection, witness, are these narrations, witness?

WITNESS: In the connection as to the question whether it was morally justifiable to arrive at the result of Sievers remaining at his post.

THE PRESIDENT: Such matters as that would not be material in this inquiry.

BY DR. WEISGERBER:

Q: Did Sievers report to you that it was possible for him to alleviate that situation at all.

A: Yes, I know of the following cases. He told me about high altitude experiments which he frustrated. He told about his sabotage of the low pressure chamber. He told about his interference in the malaria experiments; how he placed Ploetner against Schilling. He told me that he succeeded in getting a group of thirty inmates for experimental purposes from Dachau to some other place at Hodensee, and, furthermore, that he finally succeeded in subordinating these experimental series simultaneously to the Reich Research Council, so that the additional amount of paper and red tape which resulted in delays to a considerable extent.

Q: Is it correct Sievers made it possible for you to go to the ghetto at Litzmannstadt and save persons there?

A: That is correct. At that time I went there in order to save the parents of a Jewish lady from being gassed, a lady whom I could get to Stockholm with the help of Sievers. I was unfortunately too late in the case of the parents.

Q: Hence it is beyond all doubt for you that Sievers rejected the participation in those experiments which were ordered by Himmler?

A: Yes.

Q: For you there is neither any doubt that the entire activity of Sievers from 1933 up to 1945, no matter with what situation he came into contact, was only moved and dictated by his opposition to the national socialist regime.

A: That is beyond any doubt.

DR. SEISGERBER: Mr. President: I have no further questions of this witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Are there any further questions of this witness by the defense counsel?

DR. STEINBAUER (Counsel for the defendant, Professor Beiglboeck):

Q: Witness, I am an Austrian, and I, therefore, do not like to interfere in German matters. I am only putting these questions because it is my duty to do so as defense counsel. Do you remember that the first German woman who was sent to America after the war, and that was Frau Dr. Strecker, was severely attacked for saying there was no German resistance movement?

A: Yes.

Q: Do you know that she defended herself against that accusation and she said that by saying that she only wanted to express that every fight against this powerful Nazi system was almost without any hope?

A: Yes, I know that.

Q: You have already indicated that the resistance work was made difficult by the enormous Gestapo organization, SD, and you could have added the Peoples' Court, and the Concentration Camps. My question is: In addition to that police pressure, wasn't there yet another pressure, a psychological pressure, which differed itself in the case of a Gorman resistance movement, as compared to the French resistance movement. In order to understand me I want to tell you that a man named Gesavius appeared here as a witness against Goering et al, who was a man of the resistance movement, and also a leader in the Gestapo. This was called the Gesavius complex. My question is: Considering the enormous pressure of Himmler's police machine, was there yet an added psychological pressure, that one would oppose the Fatherland when opposing this enormous might?

A: In this case one has to differentiate. There were a large number of people who from the very beginning, felt that the entire national socialist regime was an alien body that had come up and with it's elimination one would do great service to one's country. In other words, there were many people in the resistance movement, who from the very beginning, just as in the case of the Frenchmen, Dutchmen and Norwegians, considered this national socialist group as an alien body and which was something like a black plague.

On the other hand, I agree with you that all of these people who had no proper judgment about national socialism from the very beginning, were inclined at first and moved by a political naive feeling, as it is so frequent in this country, to consider this regime as German.

Q: Now, let's revert to this trial. Do you believe, witness, that if my subordinate officer had received an order behind which Himmler personally was standing, that he could fail to obey this order easily?

A: It depends on what an order is. It depends to what extent he had the possibility to say yes and act no.

Q: Well, I shall ask you a more specific question. Do you believe that if this man concerned had failed to obey that order to carry out experiments on human beings, about which he already had convinced himself that they would not constitute a danger to the human being, don't you think he would have been placed immediately before a military court?

A: Naturally, a refusal to obey an order was suicide. That is clear. It only depends on whether there was a possibility to prevent the execution of that order in any way.

DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you. I have no further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Are there any further questions of the witness by defense counsel?

There being none, the Prosecution may cross examine.

CROSS EXAMINATION

BY MR. HARDY:

Q: Witness, you have stated here in direct examination that it was you who influenced Sievers to join the Nazi Party, is that right?

A: Yes.

Q: You have stated that it was you who influenced Sievers to become a member of the Ahnenerbe Society, is that correct?

A: If you ask about the responsibility, yes. As far as the technical details are concerned, no. I had left Sievers a free hand as to how he wanted to work. When he said, "This is a good position," he took it, and I said he did the right thing.

A: Now, what information did Sievers gather to further your purpose?

A: I said before that, for example, he told me what Himmler reported about Popitz. I said that he currently kept me and all the other resistance groups informed of the strength of the Waffen-SS within Germany. I said that he reported whenever Himmler made an attempt to pursue some particular political tendency. For instance, the fight against other party groups, Rosenborg for instance, could be exploited, etc.

A: Well, now, were troop movements, number of men in the Waffen-SS capable of fighting for the Nazi purpose, matters which concerned the Ahnenerbe Society?

A: No. As far as I know, Sievers knew through certain requests for newspapers or propaganda or delivery of some sort of document, or something regarding that, or Christmas celebration, or for the Party celebration, that he could suggest certain figures from the Waffen-SS to find out how many pamphlets, etc. the Ahnenerbe had to distribute. I have no idea.

A: Did you ever hear of an order put out by the Fuehrer concerning secrecy wherein no man could divulge what information he had obtained in his particular position to another man, regardless of his rank? Did you ever hear of that order — the Fuehrer's order regarding secrecy?

A: Yes, of course.

Q: Then a man who was the Reich manager of a cultural society would be able to receive information of a secret nature from another member of the SS despite this secrecy order of the Fuehrer?

A: One has to make a distinction there. I have already said that he got these figures indirectly. He simply said, "I have to know how many copies of such and such a thing I have to deliver for the Waffen-SS." He concluded the approximate strength of the SS, other information from the Wehrmacht which had espionage through Canaris could be used to check it, and afterwards had confidence in the figures and used them. And, because you asked the question, it was spoken differently in the group around Himmler in Himmler's presence and thank goodness there was a lot of drinking there and one could get information.

Q: Well, now after you received this information, Mr. Hielscher, What did you do with it?

A: Since I regularly saw the leaders or important members of other resistance groups, I exchanged this information with them because these other people also got certain information. We could exchange what they found out with what we got so there was a constant stream of information, intelligence, political secret data within our field.

Q: Now, would you kindly give me the names and addresses of the contacts that your resistance movement had with people in France, England, United States, and Russia.

A: It was probably not quite correct procedure, that we did not before 1933 think of establishing such contacts abroad. If the Nazis should come back again, I know that I have to establish contacts before hand. Unfortunately we did not do so before 1933 and after 1933 it was too late. But with the help of Sievers and Schuettekopf I made an attempt and I got to Sweden at least. I can mention Dr. Bomas, who was a Dutchman, and as far as I am informed I believe there is an affidavit on the subject. There were more people with him.

Q: Now, when did you first hear of the experiments on human beings in the concentration camps?

A: 1942, if I remember correctly.

Q: Well, now, did you understand from Sievers that —. You heard about it from Sievers, I presume?

A: Yes.

Q: Did you understand from Sievers that subjects to be used in the course of these experiments were inmates in concentration camps but that said inmates had volunteered to be used for the experiments?

A: Yes. Of course, they were called volunteers. Of course, that was part of the lieing system. Since we knew the system and since we knew the concentration camps, it was a matter, of course, if we go and say you will either be gassed or volunteer. Of course, persons volunteered, there was actually no free will for anyone who knew concentration camps.

BY JUDGE SEBRING:

Q: Doctor, did you understand that these volunteers were all German nationals who were professional criminals who had been sentenced to death with the understanding that if they survived the experiments they would be granted leniency or did you understand something else about the matter?

A: I don't know what you mean by understand. There was an order which Sievers told me about that they were supposed to be criminals and people condemned to death. On the other hand, we knew the "avalanche" reaction. We knew that Himmler liked political people to disappear and that if the order read differently there was still the danger, the great probability, that the people in charge of the concentration camps who had something to do with the experiments would use political people aimlessly or even intentionally. This was very probable; besides, our group was convinced anyhow that even in the case of people condemned to death for crimes, it does not correspond to dignity of human beings to be used formally as a volunteer but really under compulsion as guinea pigs.

Q: Well, then you considered any experimentation upon human beings incarcerated in concentration camps a criminal act?

A: We were convinced that this was in principle criminal action.

Q: Well, now, Sievers, as you say, first told you of these experiments in 1942, is that right?

A: Yes.

Q: Never told you about any negotiations for experimentation in the year 1938?

A: No. I do not remember any such thing.

Q: In the year 1939?

A: I should like to ask you something. Do you mean negotiations which lead to experiments or any discussions?

Q: Let's say, further experiments, but these experiments took place in 1939. Did you ever hear of any?

A: That experiments took place in 1939 that Sievers told me, I don't know.

Q: Never heard of him having anything to do with experiments in 1940?

A: No.

Q: 1941?

A: No.

Q: And you confirm that the first time he told you about experiments was in the year 1942?

A: Not exactly the month, but I can say approximately 1942.

Q: Now, you have told this Tribunal that you had agreed among your colleagues prior to 1933 that the Nazis could not be allowed to continue any longer. What were you doing between 1933 and 1945?

A: An agreement between my friends and myself that the Nazis had to be removed existed since 1933. In 1943 — but my group —

Q: (Interrupting) I said 1933. 1933 is the date I stated.

A: Oh, I beg your pardon, I understood 1943.

Q: How many guns did you purchase in 1933 in this resistance movement?

A: I might say, unfortunately, that the question rather by-pass the real methods of resistance. In the year 1933, when nine-tenths of the population considered this swindler a decent German, we would not shoot him, although, technically, that would, of course, have been possible at that time. We would not have succeeded in destroying the National Socialist system which did not consist of him alone, but of a whole group. We would not have changed the political situation. We were not a Putsch society that wanted to shoot him.

Q: Well then, your major interest was ridding yourselves of the two leaders, the big leaders, that is, Himmler and Hitler. Is that correct?

A: Yes. If you shoot at a whole group of birds one doesn't hit any of them. You have to shoot at an individual.

Q: I see. Then your major interest was in getting rid of Himmler and Hitler and let the rest of the Nazis continue?

A: The other way around. Repeatedly, since 1940, we waited because it would have been possible to kill Himmler and Hitler or one of them, but it was necessary, at the same time, to have a large enough part of the armed forces on our side so that immediately after the assassination we could eradicate the whole system.

Otherwise, we would not have needed to wait. That is what I said before.

Q: Well now, how close actually was Sievers to Himmler?

A: I have already said — Reich Business Manager of the Ahnenerbe and a member of the Circle of Friends.

Q: He was a member of the Circle of Friends, was he not?

A: Yes.

Q: Sievers quite frequently had talks with Himmler only in Himmler's presence. That is, no other people there. Isn't that right?

A: I don't understand. I just heard the English.

Q: Himmler and Sievers quite frequently talked alone, did they not?

A: I really don't know, but I assume so. I really don't know. I wasn't there.

Q: How many times have you seen Heinrich Himmler?

A: Not at all.

Q: Did you ever see him passing by in a parade or any such thing.

A: I would be very careful not to be out in public. One had to say "Heil Hitler" often enough not to go out of one's way to look for the occasion.

Q: Wasn't Sievers actually physically larger than Himmler? A bigger man? More robust than Himmler?

A: I don't know. I never thought about that.

Q: Well then, why didn't you think about that and instruct Sievers to do away with Himmler when he had one of these meetings with him alone. Ample opportunity to accomplish your objective without going up to kill a whiteheaded hawk in some mountain.

A: The practical question was this. If some one met Himmler and had weapons with him that was very noticeable, if one were just going to a conference, and in the second place, it wouldn't do any more than if one of the generals who was willing — for example, Witzleben since 1938 — would suddenly draw out his pistol.

I should repeatedly like to emphasize that would merely be an assassination. The decisive thing which was so terrible for all of us — we had to see to it that the system as a whole was destroyed.

Q: Well then, you would say that the July 20th plot was poor strategy? That was an obvious assassination. That was poor strategy in your way of thinking?

A: You have to make a distinction between strategy and tactics. I am convinced that the political preparation was good as far as I know. In the second place I am convinced, from all the information which I got in personal conversation, that the preparation for the military action after the execution of the assassination proper after the coup d'etat proper — was also well prepared. The generals had been learning that for centuries, they knew how to do that, but what they did not know how to do was the technique of the coup d'etat itself because the regulations of 1780 didn't contain that. The technique of the coup d'etat itself, they did not know how to do that. They had never studied it. That was the unfortunate thing. I repeat — politically, good; for later strategic execution good; for the technique of the coup d'etat proper, that was bad.

Q: And now, what did Sievers ever tell you about the skeleton collection? Did he ever tell you about that?

A: Yes, he told me that Himmler had ordered, as far as I know, they were Jewish commissars who were under this terrible execution order which was valid in the East — that some of them were to be selected and used for the skeleton collection. The order was from Himmler as Sievers reported to me.

Q: And did you know what they were going to do with these people?

A: Yes, it was the same as in the experiments. There a danger of death was a possibility, here it was certain.

Q: You knew, of course, that they were going to stand these people up, pick them out, select them according to size, take their anatomical measurements, then ship them to Natzweiler and at Natzweiler kill than, then deflesh them, then send the skeletons to the Strasbourg University for collection? And you knew that?

A: Yes.

Q: A fine thing for a resistance man to be involved in, isn't it?

A: The situation, as I have said repeatedly, was as follows: We made no distinction in the real evaluation of the skeleton collection and other experiments in which there was this so-called "volunteering" and in which the result was the same — in our eyes, they were the same thing. I should like to emphasize one more thing. Does one have the moral right to tolerate a lesser evil in order to prevent a greater evil?

Q: Just a moment. Now in connection with the skeleton collection, do you further know that they dispensed with the idea of taking Jewish commissars but selected Jewish inmates of concentration camps?

A: Yes, what particular persons were selected I do not know, of course, but I knew that a number of Jews were to be gassed and were selected for this anthropological collection. That was the same case as on the Ghetto of Litzmannstadt, the Jewish commander of the Ghetto told me, that was Lieutenant Rosenblatt-after he had gained confidence in me because I had gone in with a false pass — he told me personally "I was picked out by the SS. When of new group of Jews comes into this Litzmannstadt Ghetto and crowd the ghetto I am not to select exactly the same number of Jews, and I knew that they would be gassed. That is I was selected by the SS, to determine who was to be gassed. Now, I ask you in the name of God, Mr. Hielscher, you are a Christian, what am I to do? I had nothing to do with that. I have asked the Rabbis. I have asked the old people themselves and we have come to the decision that I must stay in this office. At least I can determine the persons — I can at least select the oldest people who can't stand life in a ghetto and perhaps, in this way, perhaps I will be able to save the life of one person. These two old people that I tell about, were about seventy years old. There were five Christians under the Jews. At least I was able to see that they were all gassed together. They asked me to, please tell their daughter we were able to achieve that. Tell me, did I do right or not?" That is even much horrible because the man could not even reduce the number He had no hope as we had to suppress some of them. Nevertheless I was ashamed that the people who were in charge of this camp were called Germans. But I said, "You have acted right and your are justified in the eyes of God."

Q: Now, Dr. I assume that the defense counsel has shown you all the documents concerning the skeleton collection. Is that right?

A: Yes.

Q: There won't be any need for me to go over them. You have stated in connection with the one document that was presented to you today on the stand that this was a very praiseworthy act on the part of Sievers in a negative way. Since you are familiar with all the skeleton collection documents — I had intended to go into each one but I will just go into one. That is, Document No-088, prosecution Exhibit 182, found in Document Book 9. This is a document which was written by Sievers. You will see that thereon his signature appears Do you recognize the signature at the bottom of the letter?

A: Yes.

Q: Well, now Sievers here is proposing a way in which they can destroy the skeleton collection so that it will not be know to any one- that is, of the Allies when they overrun Strasbourg. And you will notice, two-third of the way through, the one paragraph, that it states: This viscera could be declared as remnants of corpses apparently left in the anatomical Institute by the French." — Do you see that?

A: Yes.

Q: "In order to be cremated." Now this is an idea of one Wolfram Sievers wherein he is suggesting that these, or the results of these criminal activities be left so that it may, by the Allies, be blamed on to the French, and bearing in mind, of course that the French, as well as the United States, Great Britain and other Allies were equally as interested as the resistance movement were in defeating the Nazi regime, were they not?

A: I have already said that it was Sievers' duty to say "yes" and to act negatively but, of course, I did not praise this action, but I praised the vocabulary, the formulation. He spoke like a Nazi. The concrete question in such case was simply as follows: Can any one been saved here or not? If no one could be saved, what can I do to keep up the appearance of a Nazi since I know that Obersturmbannfuehrer [Lieutenant Colonel] Neuhaus suspects that I have some contact with the resistance movement. Sievers, since the 20th of July, or rather since my arrest, was constantly doing things to look like Nazi actions, insofar as no one is actually killed, then that is part of his duty, part of the mask without which the organization cannot operate.

Q: Yes, but from this letter does it not suggest that he was willing to allow an innocent Frenchman to answer for the crimes which flowed out of this skeleton collection activity?

A: If you show me —

Q: I have asked you—does it not appear from this letter, this letter signed by Sievers, that he was willing to allow a Frenchman to suffer for the crimes committed during the course of the collection of these skeletons?

A: Yes, the letter quite deliberately, I believe, creates this impression. That was the purpose of it, like all such letters.

MR. HARDY: I have no further questions, Your Honor.

JUDGE SEBRING: Doctor, the Tribunal would like to ask you a few questions, please.

BY JUDGE SEBRING:

Q: To what extent was the fact of the existence of concentration camps in Germany known to the people of Germany?

A: The existence of concentration camps, that is the fact that there were any?

Q: The fact that there were concentration camps in Germany—was that known to anyone?

A: In my opinion that was everywhere known since 1933.

Q: You think then — Was it known to you since 1933?

A: The fact that there were concentration camps, that was general knowledge in my opinion.

Q: Was it actually known to you that there were concentration camps in Germany?

A: Yes. Not only that, but what happened in them, because since 1933 I had opportunity to talk to people who had been in concentration camps, and in one case I succeeded in getting someone out; interestingly enough, I got a very frightened and very short report from this person.

Q: From your knowledge of the situation, how many concentration camps would you say there were in Germany during the year 1939?

A: Up to 1939 the number of concentration camps which I knew about was 5, 6, perhaps 7, no more.

Q: What would you say about the year 1940?

A: The number of concentration camps increased rapidly with the beginning of the war. First, because the NSDAP or rather the SS, began to send foreigners to these concentration camps in larger numbers; and secondly because the number of Germans who were arrested because they were opposed to the war were also added.

Q: Well, can you estimate how many were here in 1940?

A: No, I do not know any figures. The number increased considerably, however.

Q: What about 1941?

A: I can only say that I did not trouble about these figures specifically. That was outside the range of what was needed, practically.

Q: 1942?

A: I can only repeat, I do not know any figures.

Q: 1943?

A: I can only repeat the same answer.

Q: 1944?

A: I can only repeat the same answer.

Q: 1945?

A: The real number of concentration camps I learned from the publications of the Allies.

Q: These may seem odd questions to you, doctor, but there has been testimony from this witness stand that you now occupy, from certain witnesses who have taken the stand, which would tend to lead the Tribunal to believe that during all of this period of time the existence of concentration camps in Germany, in any considerable numbers, was a fact not known to the German people and was a fact not known to people within the middle and higher levels of the Nazi government and the Nazi military machine. That is the reason that the Court has addressed that question to you.

A: I can only say the following. In my opinion the existence of several—to speak very carefully—several concentration camps, was generally known to the German population. The fact that these concentration camps increased suddenly after the outbreak of war was not so generally known. It might be assumed, if I think of conversations with harmless citizens or National Socialists in railroad trains, they perhaps assumed that the concentration camps increased, but there was no idea of the numbers. But the fact that they did exist and that there were several and that there were thousands of people in them, I consider that common knowledge of the whole population. But nobody knew what was actually happening there.

Q: Now you said something a moment ago to the effect that you not only knew of the existence of concentration camps but you knew of the activities which went on in concentration camps. Did I understand you correctly?

A: Yes.

Q: Over what period of time have those activities become know to you?

A: It began with two pieces of information in 1933 which were the first of this kind and which therefore impressed themselves on my memory. I heard the first thing from Socialist friends in the very beginning. I heard that people were put into bathtubs with water of 80 degrees centigrade and that their skin was then peeled off while they were living. At about the same time I received information from my friend, Karl August Witvogel, who, through my intervention, had been released from a concentration camp in northwestern Germany. What shocked me most was the fact that this man, who did not agree with me politically but who had personal confidence in me, and who knew from his wife that I had been instrumental in having him released—that this man was extremely worried and afraid to tell me any details although I was a friend of his. He finally gave me hints about flogging and other kinds of punishment; and from then on I received information constantly.

Q: What type of prisoner was this man, a criminal or a political prisoner?

A: This man was a political prisoner.

Q: A German political prisoner?

A: A German political prisoner.

Q: Now can you say to what extent these activities were generally known among the German people?

A: I can say that these actions—what actually happened in concentration camps—to our astonishment, in view of the large number of people who went through the concentration camps, were actually unknown among the German population. That was true up to 1943. I recall long conversations with Schulenburg and Reichwein, where it was repeatedly said — "It is terrible we cannot tell the people about these things. As soon as you open your mouth you disappear yourself and nothing gets talked around."

Q: Well, would these activities be the sort of things that could be carried on as a matter of course in concentration camps without high level officials in the SS or in the government having to have some knowledge of these activities?

A: In my opinion, people of the rank of Ribbentrop, to give an example, or Kaltenbrunner, even before they gained this or that position, they must have known exactly what was going on. But I do not know about this, insular as our group, as well as the others who had been seriously thinking of an armed uprising since 1933, had to be very careful in contact with circles who were either convinced Nazis or, in the unfortunately still more customary way, were without any convictions. Any work could be suicide. And so I am not informed.

Q: To what extent, if any, was the fact that concentration camp inmates were being used for human medical experiments generally known to the German people?

A: Among the German people I personally heard nothing about it; that is, on my many trips and many talks I heard nothing about it. I do not imagine that many people knew about it.

Q: And I understood you to say that the defendant Sievers told you something about those things; during the course of any of his conversations did ha name anyone who was associated in any of these experiments, did he give you the names of anyone?

A: Yes, the first one that he gave me, and this is how our conversation started, if I remember, he gave me the name of Dr. Raschor, as the real director. He said he was a most particularly unpleasant creature.

Q: I think you said that the volunteering among concentration camp inmates for these experiments was always, in your opinion, under compulsion; that though it appeared upon the surface that an experimental subject was a volunteer; yet if the fact were known he was in truth and in fact acting under compulsion; is that what you said?

A: What I meant was the following: It was said formally every inmate volunteered for such experiments; if someone did not volunteer he suffered from it, but if he did volunteer he was promised advantages. Now, the important thing was the following: Every man who was in a concentration camp knew the system; that is, he expected that sooner or later he would have to die. For that reason he grasped at straws, and the promise that a person who volunteered for such experiment if he escaped with his life he would receive a pardon of some sort, in this promise I see objective compulsion. The people were put into such a situation by the concentration camps that any door which might lead back to life, lead to a resolution to take advantage of every opportunity. The treatment was so terrible they grasped at straws, and that is why such straws were held out to them.

Q: Doctor, I think you said Sievers discussed with you the various aspects of these experiments; let me ask you in detail what do you know about the high altitude experiments which were supposed to have been conducted in Dachau from about March to August 1942 on concentration camp inmates for the purpose of investigating the limits of human endurance and existence at extremely high latitudes; did you learn something of this from Sievers?

A: I did not ask for any details from Sievers about the various experiments. I did not ask him for any details or discussion at the beginnings, and when he was particularly excited and again in the course of the whole matter it was on the ethical question, whether there was any moral justification for his staying on his post. We did not discuss the technical details. One must remember we generally talked in the Ahnenerbe, and even if we were pretty safe there, if a third person heard one word, — if a third person heard that Sievers was talking to me about these things that would be enough to have this Fuehrer Order No. 1, which the Prosecutor mentioned, put into effect, so we stuck to the prevention of limiting our discussions to what was absolutely necessary, and that was the ethical question.

Q: I assume then that he did not tell you the names of any persons connected with this particular experiment, the high altitude experiment, other perhaps than Rascher?

A: No, with the exception of Dr. Rascher, and once when he was so happy he had helped Ploetner, he mentioned Ploetner to me. Otherwise, he told me no names.

Q: Then I assume from what you said he did not give you any details about freezing experiments conducted at Dachau in 1942, is that correct?

A: No, I do not remember of any specific details.

Q: Did he give you any particulars as to human experiments conducted at Dachau for the purpose of investigating immunization for and the treatment of malaria, from different periods, beginning with February 1942 and ending about April 1945?

A: No, he did not. I remember only that the name Ploetner as mentioned in connection with malaria, but I may be mistaken.

Q: Did he give you any particulars about experiments conducted at Sachsenhausen, Natweiler, and other concentration camps at various times from September 1939 until April 1945 on concentration camp inmates, to investigate the most effective treatment for burns caused by Lost gas?

A: Before 1942 I do not recall any such conversation. After 1942 I do not remember anything about the name Mustard Gas. I just remember that human experiments were constantly being carried out. It was all very general, and he used to say the whole thing was so terrible he didn't know what to do.

Q: Did he tell you anything about experiments conducted at Ravensbruck concentration camp from July 1942 to September 1943 on concentration camp inmates to investigate the effectiveness of sulfanilamide wherein wounds were deliberately inflicted on concentration camp subjects who were then infected with streptococci or gas gangrene, and then a treatment for that; do you nothing about that from Sievers?

A: No, I don't know much about the individual experiments.

Q: Did Dr. Sievers tell you anything about experiments conducted at Dachau from July 1944 to September 1944 to study various methods of making sea water drinkable wherein concentration camp inmates were deprived of all food and given on chemically processed sea water; did he discuss that with you?

A: No, not in detail.

Q: Did he discuss with you anything about experiments conducted at Sachsenhausen and Natzweiler concentration camps from about June 1943 to about January 1945 to investigate the causes of and inoculation against epidemic jaundice, wherein experimental subjects who were concentration camp inmates were deliberately infected with epidemic jaundice?

A: No, he didn't tell me any of the details.

Q: Did Dr. Sievers discuss with you anything about human experiments conducted at Buchenwald and Natzweiler concentration camps from about December 1941 to about February 1945 to investigate the effectiveness of spotted fever and other vaccines, wherein healthy concentration camp inmates were deliberately infected with spotted fever virus?

A: No, no details.

JUDGE SEBRING: Thank you very much.

MR. HARDY: Your Honor, I have another question or two, if the Court permits me, to put to this witness.

THE PRESIDENT: I desire to ask a few questions, then you may.

BY THE PRESIDENT:

Q: When was it, Witness, that it began to occur to you that Germany had lost or would lose the War?

A: That the War was lost seemed to me very probable from the moment it began.

Q: When did you become convinced that the war was lost?

A: That is hard to say. I should like to say it was after the 20th of July.

Q: Are you familiar with German criminal processes before the War?

A: No.

Q: Have you any idea, if a German national was convicted of murder or some crime which carried the death sentence, how long it would be after the sentence was imposed before the man would be executed?

A: I must rectify my answer that I gave before. I was a Jurist, and I studied law and I went through all the positions before I left the service, but I know nothing about the period between the sentence and execution, at least I don't recall knowing it.

Q: Did you serve in the German Army?

A: At the time I served as a Silesian, I was in the Free Corps, in 1919, against the Poles, and this was taken over by the Reichswehr [Reich Defense]. The Free Corps unit there wanted to take part in the Kapp-Putsch, and since I didn't approve of this I left, I left.

Q: In a German Army occupying foreign territory, and if certain of those foreign nationals were charged and convicted of the crime of sabotage against the German Army, and condemned to death by military or other German Court, in that foreign country, have you any idea how long it would be before that sentence would be executed?

A: Do you mean in the National Socialist Army?

Q: I don't understand you, Witness

A: Do you mean the National Socialist Army in the second World War?

Q: Yes.

A: I know nothing about that in general. I only know that it was very quickly carried out.

Q: Do you have any idea, that foreign nationals who were so convicted would be sent back to Germany to be executed?

A: I know of shootings, even without a sentence, and I don't know what was done if such quick justice was not carried out.

Q: Do you think it probable that such foreign nationals, tried and convicted before a German Military or Occupational Court in a foreign country, and sentenced to death, would then be sent back to Germany, persons under that sentence of death so imposed.

A: I don't know of any such case.

THE PRESIDENT: Has counsel for the Prosecution any inquiry?

MR. HARDY: I just have one or two questions, your Honor.

BY MR. HARDY:

Q: Regarding these letters written by Sievers that you say you admired the way in which Sievers wrote because of his position; did you see those letters prior to your appearance here in Nurnberg?

A: No, I did not see the letters before they appeared here. What I give credit for is the authentic national socialist tone.

Q: Did you ever see any letters wherein Sievers wrote to members of the Party, or concerning Party activities, such as these letters which are in evidence before this Tribunal; did you ever see any of these letters prior to your appearance here in Nurnberg, of any description?

A: Unless they were sent to members of my own organization and were camouflaged letters, no.

Q: Did Sievers ever tell you about the way he conducted himself concerning some of these various criminal activities of the Nazis?

A: You mean in connection with the experiments, or what do you mean?

Q: Yes, in connection with the experiments?

A: Sievers told me, that was at the beginning when we had this fundamental discussion which lasted some time, he said he would try to carry out sabotage wherever he could as General Secretary, and as always, I left him a completely free hand to carry this out, as I did with all my people.

Q: Now then, when this process started, that is, I will go further back, when the International Military Tribunal served the indictment on Goering, et al, did you at that time volunteer the information you possessed to any investigating authority concerned with these trials here in Nurnberg?

A: Since 1945, since Professor Heiler made me acquainted with the American Military Government in Harburg, I described to this M G, as well as the English Military Government in Goettingen and Hamburg our resistance group. Is that what you mean?

Q: I mean, did you ever tell any Military Government directly concerned with Military Tribunals, for instance, did you ever write to Mr Hardy, care of I.M.T., and tell him you had information concerning medical experiments. During the past two years, since the end of the war did you write to anyone and inform them that you could enlighten them as to some of the activities regarding the medical experiments?

A: I did not write to Mr. Hardy.

Q: Did you write to anyone?

A: I went to severed agencies, and I was always given the name of a different office, and they always said they were not competent. Since 1945 I have been offering my help, and have been saying I could give information about Sievers, and all his actions. I was never able to give this testimony, because as I have said everyone sent me on to someone else, and everyone said he was not competent. This continued until I finally found Mr. Weisgerber, and this trial, was finally opened to our joy.

MR. HARDY: No further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Are there any further questions of the witness of any defense counsel?

DR. NELTE: Dr. Nelte, counsel for Handloser.

THE PRESIDENT: Counsel, how long will you examination of the witness take.

DR. NELTE: Perhaps 20 minutes.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now be in recess until 9:30 tomorrow morning.

(Thereupon Court adjourned until 9:30 a.m. April 16, 1947)