1947-04-21, #3: Doctors' Trial (afternoon)

AFTERNOON SESSION (The hearing reconvened at 1330 hours, 21 April 1947.)

THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.

GERHARD ROSE — Resumed DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued)

BY DR. HEINZ FRITZ (Counsel for the defendant Rose):

Q: Professor, before the recess you quoted a passage from the book by Moll. Would you please continue to answer this important question?

A: I spoke above all of the considerations which influenced the doctor in the problem of experimentation and I have mentioned the problem of the research fanatic and the danger which he implies for our profession. In consideration of this entire problem, aside from the doctor performing the experiment, there is a well-known historical example. When the Oriental method of variolation was introduced in Europe, not a vaccination with cowpox, King George the First ordered that the procedure be tested on six criminals who had been condemned to death. The legation Doctor Maitland, who was in charge of carrying out this experiment, refused to perform the operation, not for any ethical considerations for the fate of the experimental subjects, but for the personal consideration that he might be considered an assistant of the hangman if this experiment should be unsuccessful. The refusal was brought about by fear of damage to his own reputation. Maitland did not want to get into touch with the hangman.

I spoke of the research fanatic before but I do not want to be misunderstood. I do not want you to think that I consider every doctor who accepts an assignment for human experiment an unfeeling, cold, research fanatic. That would be unjust. I know too many research workers in various nations personally who conducted experiments on volunteers and on non-volunteers. I, therefore, know quite well what mental conflicts result from such work for such a man and understand what an enormous burden he feels himself when he takes on such a task. The prosecution and the Tribunal as jurors are in the fortunate position of never having been in touch with such a conflict, although their profession too involves serious responsibility.

To them I must explain this whole aspect of the problem of medical experiments on human beings. It would be useless to take examples from this trial. An impartial explanation of the real state of affairs would be very difficult with the persons involved in this trial. I shall take as an example an experiment which must be discussed anyway because it forms the scientific basis and the immediate predecessor of the one for which I am held responsible here. This is the first experiment for the development of vaccination with living bacteria, living plague bacteria. If you later read the corresponding document you will see that these experiments were conducted on criminals, on criminals condemned to death who were not volunteers. You will be able to read how the worker, the scientist, Proceeded, step by step, in this experiment with very small quantities of living bacteria, gradually increased the amount until he had reached the amount necessary for vaccination.

If he then concludes the series of experiments with the conditions as astonishing as it may seem, with these large doses, caused no serious consequences.

And, if the fact that his experimental subjects had fever up to 40° he does not call that a serious reaction. That may seem to laymen a cynical remark but whoever who knows this field of work and whoever knows this scientist personally knows what amount of bitter worry and concern was borne by this man through weeks and months that his theory might be proved false and that the persons might fall ill of plague and die of it. Now this experiment which was conducted forty years ago is justified by its success today. On that is based modern protective vaccine against plague with living avimulent plague bacilia. But, there is another series of experiments conducted by the same man, also on criminals condemned to death. This time the experimental subjects had had to sign an agreement that they submitted to the experiments. These were experiments to determine the cause of Beri-Beri. For this purpose the disease had to be caused artificially by inadequate nutrition. It was possible to produce the disease and it is described in great detail how through long weeks the symptoms of this serious disease developed — paralysis, painful neuritis, serious heart ailments appeared which finally led to the death of one experimental subject and the person was dissected a half an hour after death. For the person who does not know the disease Beri-Beri it is difficult to imagine the spiritual burden on the doctor who for weeks must observe and nurse these experimental subjects and must record all the details of the symptoms of the disease which he himself has caused by his own measures. This experiment was successful in so far as it was possible to produce a typical disease in a large number of experimental subjects, but the experiment did not have scientific success. The answer as to what factor was the real cause of the disease was not found because the experiment was uneven in its course. Even the consolation of justification by success was lacking in this experiment to the doctors who carried it out, to the Government authorities who approved it, and to the persons who were subjected to it.

What burden this experience is on the doctor a layman cannot understand. The question immediately results, "What is the reason for a person voluntarily assuming this burden or accepting it when it is given by order of the Government authority?" It would be a cheap answer to find the motive or ambition for research fanaticism. I know the real reason in this case. I know the man and the conditions under which he worked. The driving force was alone a feeling of duty and responsibility — the the feeling of responsibility to the millions of natives for whose health he was responsible that were doing by hundreds and thousands from this terrible plague and the hundreds and thousands that were suffering terrible pain from this Beri-Beri disease. The knowledge of having to help these people and still with the state of knowledge at the time being powerless. That was the reason to look for new means to take such a burden on himself and expecting other people to submit to such suffering. The experiments which I have been speaking about wore carried out by Professor Richard P. Strong. He was Public Health officer in Manilla at that time, later professor at Harvard University in Boston and Chairman of the Medical Society for Tropical Medicine. I hoped that the prosecution would not attempt to dismiss the work of this highly respected research worker with the words, "There are criminals everywhere". I ask you to believe me that Strong was a man of greatest feeling of duty and responsibility and of the highest ethics and if the Prosecution does not believe that he can consult his expert, Professor Alexander because he is a doctor from Boston and he probably knows Strong even better than I do. But, I ask you to believe me — that in ethics and motives of most German doctors who consented to take over the collaboration in such experiments were not so enormously different from those of their foreign colleagues in the same situation. There are three dead German professors in the dock today — President Gildemeister, Eppinger of Vienna, and Professor Holzloehner of Kiel. Because they are dead they are even more exposed to the defense and criticism before the Tribunal than we who at least have the opportunity to defend ourselves.

For that very reason I feel obligated to speak for these gentlemen today although at the time when they were doing their work I was definitely opposed to them. From two of these men I know from their own mouths that they — that is Gildemeister and Holzloehner — were influenced by feeling as doctors their duty to prevent disease and distress that they did not accept their part lightly and without responsibility. But personally Professor Gildemeister said that to me in our conversation. I do not know however about Professor Eppinger from his own mouth since I never spoke to him but I know his personality enough so that I may include Am in this statement as well.

MR. HARDY: Your Honors, I submit that the defendant is going outside of the scope of this case before the Bar and the examination discontinue along these lines and come back to the issue of this case. I didn't object to him giving the example of Professor Strong even though the Tribunal has ruled that such evidence will be taken up at a later date. I think that we have gone far enough along these lines and request the Tribunal to instruct defense counsel to continue his examination on the issues.

THE PRESIDENT: The defendant has taken the stand as a witness in his own defense. He is entitled to testify to any facts which he believes should be placed before the Tribunal for that defense which he has. But, matters of argument should not be introduced by the witness. His counsel may argue the case and draw knowledge from the examination which he thinks would be pertinent and which he thinks would help the Tribunal. But, the testimony of the witness should be limited to facts which in his opinion bear upon his defense.

A: May I remark that I believe that here I was giving absolutely factual testimony on behalf of these men because Chief of Counsel in his introduction spoke — expressly demanded that the motives of the defendants be presented here in all clarity. My motives were influenced by my experiences and work abroad. And I wanted to explain here to what extent my considerations, my decisions, in this question were influenced by my own personal approval.

MR. HARDY: Your Honors, the Prosecution true is interested in finding out motives of the defense. We are more interested in finding out the motives of Professor Rose had in being implicated in these matters but we are not interested in the motives of Gildemeister and Eppinger and others. We are only interested in the motives of the 23 defendants in the dock at this time.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal permitted the witness to proceed so far but as to matters of extraneous argument by analogy to what other doctors he has known have done is not particularly pertinent to this case and counsel may argue in brief any matters which are deemed pertinent as legal argument but the witness should limit himself more to facts with his own defense.

A: May I add just one sentence perhaps that, of course, I did not intend in my statements to include Dr. Rascher and Ding. If he didn't say that I am in the diary — that seems the statements were interrupted, they might be distributed to that effect. Then formulated list of various reasons which occasioned me to protest experiments even on criminals condemned to death. I would not want this enormous charge to be laid on our profession. In addition to all that we have to bear without it. As hygienists we spend our lives among human misery and among experimentation. We are sent to places from where other people flee. It is a matter of course for us to risk our own lives from being exposed.

I don't know how many doctors and assistants in the more than fifty years of the Robert Koch Institute have died there from infections acquired in the laboratory. Certainly more than twenty. There is no memorial tablet in their honor. Such a sacrifice is given silently. It is simply among the ethics of our profession and therefore one will probably understand my desire to preserve at least my honor.

Now, to conclude this whole consideration of the ethical aspect a few words about the volunteering of the experimental subjects, and in an experiment dangerous to life what this means to the doctor performing the experiment. I am by no means so one-sided researcher that I would not realize that the question plays a very important role from the legal point of view, but from the medical point of view I may emphasize that there is a very definite group of experiments which includes, for example, the typhus experiments in Buchenwald, the yellow fever experiments in Cube, the sub-cooling experiments of Holzloehner in which the doctor in general, including myself, must consider it immoral to take volunteers. The spiritual burden on the doctor conducting the experiment is, in such a case, intolerable, He does not have the right to accept an offer of suicide. Such experiments, in my opinion, are admissible only if the person who holds the state authority determines the persons from among the group of persons who have forfeited their lives through committing deeds against society. That I, for my person, reject this method altogether I already stated publicly years ago. The prosecution has already admitted this as a fact. I am not saying this for the first time here in the court room. In the interests of my profession as a research worker and for the medical profession I desire for all future that human society and those who hold state sovereignty shall not impose this bitter duty on us.

I know that that is merely my personal opinion, and history teaches that at all times and in many states the decision was different and that there have always been morally high doctors who believed they were fulfilling their duty by carrying out such experiments. On various opportunities when I dealt with problem I presented these considerations which I have presented here during half an hour are, in effect, contained in the one sentence with which I involuntarily reacted when Gildemeister, for the first time, told me, and I therefore repeat this sentence. "If this method becomes the fashion, then we turn over all immunology to the hangman and open a special execution department here in the Institute." This feeling was the decisive one in this problem. In my statements I emphasized the spiritual burden on the doctor who mast conduct this experiment. I have spoken very little of the victim of the experiment, for the simple reason that the whole problem lies with the doctor and arises from the suffering of the victim to whom the sector conducting the experiment is nearest, and this sympathy with the victim of the experiment is such a matter of course for a accent doctor that would not even mention it if I did not see the danger that, because of the failure to mention this point of view, one might later distort my statements.

Q: Is the view of the problem of dangerous experiments on human beings which you have just propounded the general opinion of all doctors?

A: Certainly not. Otherwise experiments on human beings would not be as common as they actually are.

It would not be approved by the state.

Q: You quoted from Moll's book about medical ethics. does this work actually have the fundamental importance for the medical profession which the witness Leibbrandt ascribed to it?

A: That is certainly not the case. Doctors, if they are Germans who think about medical ethics certainly know the book, but among other doctors there may be perhaps two among a hundred who know it.

Q: And now do you feel about the contents of this book?

A: It is undeniable that the author tries to demonstrate a very high ideal of the medical profession but the book also snows very clearly that he is aware that in practical life things are very often different from what he demands as an ideal. Besides, the cook was published forty-five years ago and, of course, is obsolete on many points today.

Q: How do you feel about the point of view expressed in the book about experiments on human beings and on animals?

A: Fundamentally, Moll writes what is a matter of course for everyone, out in this field it is very definitely shown that the book is influenced by its time. Moll considers immunization against typhus and against plague as experiments on human being — as an inadmissible experiment. Ten years after the publication of the book these methods were generally used, He also expresses objections to vaccinations against diphtheria and against tetanus. Today, failure to carry out these measures can; under certain circumstances, be legally prosecuted. But the central purpose of this trial Moll does not deal with at all.

The question of whether the state has the right to force individuals to submit to medical experiments and to order doctors to conduct such experiments. One might bring one sentence from this boom into this connection. On page 500, Moll says that the research scientist has no right for executive such as the government claims. At this time he rejects experiments by a doctor on his own initiative, but he obviously permits experiments with state approval. In his long statements, Moll repeatedly objects to experiments on patients, particularly experiments on hopelessly ill patients which, in the past century, was so common, so wipe-spread that there was a special technical expression for it. It w s c lied "the experiment on the corpus vile". Even today this experiment has not disappeared completely from literature. From the document which Dr. Servatius submitted here we have seen that the Military Government itself apparently still considers this experiment permissible. At only one point does Moll approve of a government approved experiment. That is the well-known leper experiment by the American Dr. Arning on a murderer condemned to death, and Moll admits that others could have a different opinion. Whether it is worthy of a doctor to perform such an experiment — here the point of view of medical ethics of a doctor is repeatedly the prevailing one, not that of the victim, and of the voluntariness. Moll comes to the conclusion that voluntariness under such conditions could not be ethically recognized. That is on page 538 of the book which Leibbrandt quoted. Also Moll objects to the validity of such declarations of voluntariness which are often included in publications of medical work.

He proves that they are quite generally untrue. First of all, because of the incapacity of the experimental subjects for coming to any judgment because of the Influence exerted by the authority of the doctor and fear of consequences of refusal. But the decisive point is that Moll is speaking only of experiments on patients and not on experimental subjects determined by the government. to that extent the quotation of Mr. Leibbrandt was not applicable to this trial.

Actually Moll knew about state experiments. The smallpox vaccines on criminals, orphans, soldiers, were known, Moll deals with the transfer of venereal disease to patients, and knew the experiments conducted by order of the French Government. He must have known of Huffgen's experiments with plague vaccine carried out in prison in Bombay. That all happened before the publication of his book. If he does not comment on this problem at all I can only conclude that he approved State approved experiments. He emphasized repeatedly that the War does not have the right of execution, that is up to the state.

Q: What do you know about the opinions of the doctors who consider state approved experiments on human beings admissible?

A: I have already said in my protest against Ding's lecture I Id not find any uniform approval agreement. If you will look at the record of this meeting you will find a sentence there which escaped the attention of the Prosecutor, but which clearly shows, for a participant in the meeting, that he was opposed to these experiments, and it proves that there was discussion about it. On page 111 there is a sentence, "Such experiments are necessary." This sentence refers to the discussion and this statement is proof that the listeners, the auditors, believed since Ding had issued them this that the experimental subjects were criminals condemned to death. Otherwise, there would not have been anyone in public meeting who would have expressly approved such experiments. Certainly not the person responsible for this sentence, whose life achievement in the service of humanity and his international reputation could protect him from openly participating in any action not in the interest of humanity. Besides I have answered this question already in my fundamental statement.

DR. FRITZ: Mr. President, this remark was made by Professor Uhlenhuth. This is in Rose Document 38, in Volume III. I have already submitted this document as Rose Exhibit 10. They are the copies of the report of the third meeting on page Mi of the Document book, last paragraph, page 111 of the original. Professor Uhlenhuth is speaking of the typhus experiments.

On page 45, first paragraph, the second line from the end there is the sentence which the defendant Rose has emphasized, "Such experiments are necessary." This sentence shows that admissibility was discussed at the meeting on the basis of Professor Rose's protest. All these statements about admissibility were stricken out of the statement of Schreiber, but this statement of Professor Uhlenhuth was forgotten.

Q: What do you know about the reasons for this protest being ignored, and the typhus experiments being carried out in spite of it?

A: They are in part contained in the explanation which Conti gave, but the result is the experiment from the situation prevailing at the time. In the winter of 1941-1942 we were at the beginning of an enormous typhus epidemic. It was clearly to be seen that it would be serious. What typhus means during wartime or how many human victims it means, every doctor knows, not only hygienists, and every layman knows that who looks at Cincer's book, the American typhus works, "Men, Lice and History." That is typhus experiments during the last war In view of the new type of warfare it was not interrupted in the winter, where obvious at that time the use of vaccines therefore was of importance. Recognizing value, there was only one vaccine, the Weigl vaccine from lice intestines, and with this experiment in Buchenwald proved that our judgment which seemed based on the experience of 10 to 15 years was mistaken. We all believed that this vaccine protected against infection. In Buchenwald we saw that this was not true. But one thing was certain, in the case of this lice vaccine that it would be impossible ever to produce it in an adequate amount. In the Weigl procedure every louse must receive an injection separately in the rectum. The intestine of each louse must be separated separately. For one dose of vaccine you must get from 50 to 1185 louse intestines. One louse needs several meals of blood daily. The louse can be fed only on human beings. There is no other means of feeding lice in the laboratory. Even an infected louse can only feed on human beings. We therefore need in the laboratory hundreds of people who do nothing except let themselves be bit by lice.

That makes it clear even to laymen what difficulties there are in this procedure. Naturally, there are other difficulties. If one breeds millions of lice then there are epidemics among the lice. Then suddenly the millions of lice are dead. But I don't want to go into details. In reality it is even more difficult than I have described. But now at the very beginning of the war we have new procedures that have been developed among vaccine specialists, and were developing our opinion about the value of these procedures, different meanings like black and white, but in the concentration of those vaccines there was no clarity at all. The responsible men of the health service, like Conti, for example, were making a difficult digest, effecting the life of thousands and tens of thousands of human beings, and the decision had to be made instantly. Typhus would not wait. The epidemic was there and was calling for victims, hundreds every day. The opinions of the specialists did not give any help to the definite authorities. The specialists disputed each other and did not know what was right, but one thing was certain if a false decision was reached, if a wrong decision was reached this mistake meant the death of thousands or tens of thousands of human beings. It was said here once on the witness stand that experiments on human beings to determine the value of typhus vaccine was not necessary, because an enormous epidemic would have offered the best opportunity to test the vaccines in practice without any experiment. Such a statement can be made only by a person who has no idea whatever about what testing of vaccine and epidemiological evaluating of vaccines means. First of all, what is testing? In practice it means nothing but that large groups of people are vaccinated with various vaccines, and then another group is left without vaccination, and then one waits to see how many people fall ill, and how many die in the various groups. That is the normal procedure in normal times. It cannot be done without death. On the contrary one need merely look at the statistics on such epidemiological evaluations in order to know what numbers of deaths there are. If after some period of time, after several years perhaps, the statistics are set up, then I can determine Vaccine-A was excellent.

Only a few people fell ill from "A", and only a very small number died. Vaccine-B was considerably worse, and there were many illnesses and many died, and Vaccine-C was no good at all. People died like flies in that group. The whole thing has cost a few thousand lives. The man at the task can console himself if he had not vaccinated at all they would have died anyhow, but it is a higher power I have nothing to do with. I selected the various vaccines on the basis of laboratory results, that Vaccine-C which was so promising according to animal experiments would be a complete failure on human beings nobody could predict. I am not responsible for the deaths That is how the thing looks in theory, but how about practice? A theatre of war is not a laboratory where every guinea pig has his number. Fleeing masses of people rush back and forth. The statements which individuals make when they are accepted into hospitals are more than questionable. They don't have their shot record any more. You are forced to rely on oral information. We have experienced here that in the third month of the trial typhoid and typhus and the vaccines are confused, although it has been repeatedly pointed out and although the interpreters are no doubt above average in intelligence. One can imagine what happened, questioning patients about their vaccination, especially if they were asked what type of vaccines were used, whether lice or lung vaccine or egg vaccines. No doubt say in the Wehrmacht, the different vaccines are recorded on the paper of the soldier. One need only to issue an order that the nature of the vaccines be recorded correctly. Of course such an order is given, but how is it carried out? In a different section I looked at the record book of soldiers of the German Wehrmacht for record of vaccinations, and I looked at the papers of captured allied soldiers for vaccination entries, when I could get a hold of such papers.

I can only assure you if one wants to set up medical statistics of such material, that is a hopeless task. The epidemiological evaluation is a useful procedure in times of peace with a more or loss resident population. Under war conditions, the comparative evaluation of various vaccines is practically impossible. If that were not so, then we would not have had the dispute lasting for decades among experts about typhus and cholera vaccines and that is quite an advantageous construction for this trial and is shown by the following fact. The material of typhus vaccinations was considered by various experts in Germany; for the Army by the Institute at Kraeew and the Luftwaffo also sent their material there and did not set up its own institute, for the civilian population if Germany. Gildemoister collected this material for the Robert Koch Institute; Otto in Frankfort collected this material. We have heard from Mrugowsky that he collected such material for the Academy for the General Government, and it was Budecke who collected this material at the Warsaw Institute. Up to 1945 not a single me of these authorities was in any position to make even a preliminary report about the value of the various vaccines, net to mention making any publication. In all world literature, up to today, with the exception of the work of Ding, I do not knew a single successful publication on this subject. It may of course be, since I have been in custody for two years, that something has been published in the meantime.

These practical difficulties of epidemiological evaluation of vaccine procedures has boon long known. The German health leader, Conti, faced the decision of whether he was simply to take the part of his untested vaccines, produced in largo quantities and use them or whether he wanted to ask the Government for approval, in view of the groat urgency of the problem, to obtain an answer through human experiments.

State Secretary Conti took this way. He decided that a number of people, determined by the state, were to risk their lives and in part to sacrifice their lives in order to obtain this answer on which depended the lives of thousands of others. The state authorities at the time took the responsibility for this, as in all states it takes the responsibility in war time for hundreds of thousands of human lives being sacrificed for much, less important aims. The results have justified intellectually Mr. Conti's decision.

Purely intellectually I said. The Buchenwald experiments had four main results. First of all they showed that belief in the protective effect of Weigl vaccine was a mistake, although this belief seemed to be based on long observation. Secondly, they showed that the useful vaccines did not protect from infection out almost certainly from death, under the conditions, of the Buchenwald experiments. Third, they showed that the objection of the biological experts of the egg yolk vaccines to the lice vaccines were unjustified, but egg yolk, rabbit lungs, and lice intestines wore of equal value. We learned this only through the Buchenwald experiments. This led the way open to mass production of typhus vaccines.

The Buchenwald experiments showed in time that several vaccines wore useless. First, the procedure according to Otto and Wehlrab, the procedure according to Pox, the procedure of Rickettsia Prowazoki, and Rickettsia muring, that is vaccine from egg cultures.

Secondly the vaccines of the Behring works which were produced according to Otto procedure, but with ether concentrations. finally the Ipson vaccine from mouse liver. The vaccine of the Behring works were in actual use at that time in thousands of doses. They always represented a trend to health. Without those experiments the vaccine, which were recognized as useless, would have been produced in large quantities, because they all had one thing in common, that their technical production was much simpler and much cheaper that that of the useful vaccines. In any case, one thing is certain, that the victims of this typhus Buchewald test did not suffer in vain and did not die in vain. There was only one choice, bigger sacrifice of human lives of persons determined for that purpose or to let things run their course, to endanger the lives of innumerable human beings who would be selected not by the Reich Criminal Police office but by blind fate.

How many people were sacrificed we can figure out today; how many people were saved by these experiments, we can of course not prove. The individual who owes his life to these experiments does not know it and he perhaps is one of the accusers of the doctors, who assumed this difficult task.

Q: Witness Bernhard Schmidt on 19 February here stated that in his opinion human being experiments wore no good whatever in the investigation of typhus vaccines; what do you hold on this question?

A: Bernhardt Schmidt's testimony is clear proof to me what sort of nonsense a witness can say when he is under the pressure of four and if afraid he will express himself to publicity and to the public eye by his testimony.

I really don't think you have to be a specialist hygienist, but I think every layman will see immediately what an enormous advantage it would be if human being experiments were available for testing the efficacy of vaccines, whether it be typhus vaccines or any other. And, then the numerous human being experiments would not have boon made, which were made throughout the world, if they had been so nonsensical as Schmidt here stated. Effort would have been spared, many lives would have been saved, if it were not that the fundamental ethical principles stood in opposition to this and made them the exception rather than the rule. Schmidt's testimony was so senseless that I even detected the prosecutor, Mr. McHaney, smiling.

Q: Can you give us numbers by which we can have some standard to which we can measure the extent of typhus infection?

A: Of course, I do not have the Documents here that I would have if I had freedom. What I collected during the war was either taken into custody or burned. There is a number in Halder's diary for February, 1942 only for the Army; ten thousand cases of typhus and 1,300 fatalities, but that is just the beginning of the catastrophe. Then I remember another number the year of 1944, at that time I concluded a summary in order to justify the extent of the need for DDT preparations. On the basis of the Documents that I had in 1944, I ascertain that there were 80,000 to 90,000 cases of typhus during that period, but I do not know for certain which circle of persons is concerned. German Wehrmacht was included in the number; Prisoners of War were certainly not included, because the number of cases among them was always kept secret from me.

The terrible catastrophe in Russia among the Russian Prisoners of War in 1940 and 1941 in the winter was to a large extent a typhus catastrophe. In December of 1940, I was in a field hospital for typhus victims in the cast — a typhus hospital for Prisoners of War; in this one hospital, which take care of only a very limited area there were hundreds of Russians sick with typhus, just on this one visit. At another place I was told that even among the German guards, there wore 140 cases of typhus. That was just the beginning, because I made this observation in December of 1941.

In the German home country, delousing measures in the east provided some protection; however, by the end of the war, as far as I know, there were 16,000 cases of typhus among the civilian population, to whom it was the least dangerous of all. The really large numbers in concentration camps and in the camps of foreign workers and in the prisons. I never ascertained or never found cut, because those statistics were never published. Despite the protest of the medical service they wore kept secret from us on orders of the police. The so camps were really the main source of infection and most fatalities took place there. The witness from the camp at Natzwoiler assorted that in his camp alone there were more than a thousand cases. The 1944 epidemic in Belsen in 1945 was to a large extent a typhus catastrophe. That can clearly be seen from the Belsen trial.

In the summer of 1942 I spoke with the Director of the Health Service and the Governor General. There were known 150,00,0 cases of typhus, despite a very inadequate information service and the peak had not been reached by any means. Though I cannot give any precise figures I do know that the responsible officers were affected by the numbers. After the war of 1914-1918, and the lessons that had been taught us, we believed in Germany that we had no need to further fear typhus and we could effectively dispose of typhus by the methods which had been developed so far and we thought that the resettlement in the years 1939 and 1940 seemed to corroborate that view, at that time 500,000 persons were transferred from a typhus area, and we had only nine cases of typhus and no single death, then came entirely different conditions, winter warfare in Russia, and no one had counted on this catastrophic development which I have already described. I hoard often enough the desperate complaint on the part of doctors in the East and that they did not have enough vaccine, and then there was the difficulty of delousing. In 1943 we were able to develop useful DDT preparations, which despite war conditions, we introduced. Then hardly had we progressed so far but production difficulties arose, destruction of raw material and of manufacturing cantors by bombing attacks and the destruction of our transports on the way. No one can imagine today with what bitter disappointment this effort to combat epidemics was beset.

Q: So far as your documentation is concerned, and with your experience during the first world war, how could this catastrophic development have been anticipated by any one working with this documentation and with this experience?

A: The document statistics had made it possible to see as early as 1940-1941 that this development was going to take place here as follows: On the one hand there were the experiences in the Galician camps in Austria, the Galician evacuees, where in a few weeks thirty thousand people fell ill of typhus; and then there was the terrible typhus outbreak among the Serbian and Albanian refugees, where there were 210,000 fatalities.

Since these 210,000 fatalities are proved it must be that the number of actual cases was estimated much too low, because that would be a fatality of seventy per-cent and the fatality is never more than thirty. Since the year 1915 the number of people who fell sick of Typhus in Russia before the war amounted to 40,000 annually. This number rose during the winter of 1910-1919 to 1,700,000, In the year 1920 it rose to 3,000,000 and the Ukrainanians and Turkestans are not included in this number, nor the Siberians. In Russia in 1910-1920 it was 15 million, and Tarrasewitch, the Russian Hygienist, said it was 25 million. These numbers were known to every hygienist and can be found in any hygienic text book. It must be said in addition, that even under the most favorable conditions, the fatalities from typhus are at least five per-cent of those infected and under unfavorable circumstances thirty per-cent. Now, despite the improvement in the health service in Russia, after the Russian Revolution, nevertheless in 1936, 42,000 cases of typhus occurred. Those were the last official statistics that we received from Russia. Mrugowsky has already mentioned the fact that Napoleon's catastrophe in 1812 was a typhus catastrophe, be in the Luftwaffe, as early as 1941, before the typhus catastrophe began, we saw the reports of the German doctors on the typhus catastrophe in Napoleon's campaign. This was passed from hand to hand and could not have been issued publicly because that would have been construed as defeatism.

Q: And despite the fact that you know all of these things you protested at first to Gildemeister against these experiments, and then after you came back from Buchenwald and had a talk with Conti, you had another show down with Gildemeister. Then again despite the fact that you knew these facts and despite the knowledge of the importance of the results at Buchenwald you made a formal protest.

A: The fact cannot be disputed, I put the ethical, consideration in the foreground in this whole matter, although I saw, of course, how strong the arguments were that the other persons had, namely those who actually did the experiments.

Q: Now there are two entries in Ding's diary that seem to contradict your attitude at certain times, first of all the entry on page 38 of document book 12, that you received a Bucharest vaccine from Professor Ruge, which was made available by you. The Prosecutor commented on this on page 1180 of the German record. He said:

From this we can deduce that Professor Rose was impressed by what he saw on 17 March, and now by providing vaccines which were to be tested, he contributed to the criminal conspiracy.

A: A large number of vaccines were sent to the medical inspectorate during the course of the war, including; typhus vaccines. They were sent in from doctors outside who wanted to bring our attention to something new. The inspectorate could do nothing with these vaccines either. They simply sent them on to me. After all of these years it is difficult to remember all of the details as to just what vaccines did reach my hands, because I couldn't do anything with these vaccines either. I simply had a desk at my disposal and no laboratory facilities. In my civilian laboratory no work on typhus was being done. If they were vaccines which were already known, I stated that the vaccines could be used without any misgiving's, and if they were new vaccines that I did not know about, then depending; on the size of the sample, I sent this sample on to one or several typhus research men and asked them to concern themselves with this problem and I concerned myself about the matter no further because I had done what was expected of me as the specialist. I can remember one specific shipment of Ruge from Bucharest. That was not a vaccine from the institute Contaguiesenn, as Ding stated in his diary, but that was a vaccine from the Frankfurt institute, which was sent to the inspectorate, because the reactions were too severe. Ruge even assorted that this vaccine contained live virus because the reaction to it was so severe.

It could be seen from the label that this was a Frankfurt vaccine which with many people had been vaccinated. In 1939 I gave myself three injections of this vaccine. That was a double dose and nothing Unusual happened so I sent it to Frankfurt and a perfectly normal report was sent back and then the vaccine was used. Whether over and above that Professor Ruge sent a second shipment to me or to the medical inspectorate which then Ruge sent to me, with the best will in the world, I can neither affirm nor deny today.

I can only say for certain one thing. I sent no such sample to Dr. Ding because I had no connections with Ding and I did not think of him as one of the research men to whom I sent such samples, nor did I issue any order that this Bucharest vaccine or any other vaccine should be tested on human beings. This diary entry strikes me as very peculiar. It is stated — 29-8-42 — now Ding twice reported on the testing of this vaccine, once at the Consulting Conference in 1943 and then in 1943 in the "Zeitschrift fuer Hygiene and Infektionskrankheiten" (Journal for Infectious Diseases and Hygiene). This is Mrugowsky Document No. 9, pages 81 to 85. Both times Ding had occasion to express his thanks for the support he had received. If he had carried out this testing on my suggestion, then he would have been obligated, according to scientific custom, to state that that was so. However, he did not do this in either case. His publication is available to the Tribunal. And, finally, it was at this sane conference at which he reported on this vaccine that we had our squabble and that would have been the greatest excuse he could have found to say, "I don't understand you, Dr. Rose. Send me vaccine to be tested and then all of a sudden you protest." He might have said that he didn't have presence of mind to do this. But, we heard from the witness Kogon that Ding concerned himself about this natter for days on end and dumb as he was, if he thought about it long enough, this argument would have occurred to him. I can only explain this entry by the fact he received the vaccine from a third source which knew simply it had gone through my hands. All this based on assumption that I really did have the vaccine in my possession which I really do not know. Or it could be that Ding found out with correspondence with Ruge that Ruge had sent me this Bucharest vaccine and also this is based on assumption. That he really did this I do not know. From the documents it can be seen that there was frequently correspondence between Ding and Ruge because both the witness Kogon mentioned Ruge as one of Ding's correspondents on page 1193 of the German record and in Document 484, which is Balachowsky's affidavit, on page 72 of the German Document Book.

Here the people are listed with whom Ding corresponded and Huge is mentioned among them. But neither Kogon nor Balachowsky's names are given among those who had contact or connections with Ding. At any rate I never transmitted mail between Ding and Ruge. That the two men had connections I did not know until the beginning of this trial.

Q: Well, according to Ding in the periodical for Hygiene Ding says in Mrugowsky Document No. 9, and from what he said at the consulting conference, this Bucharest vaccine turned out to be useful and was used by the German Luftwaffe.

A: I saw no report on the testing of this vaccine which I should have had to see if he had wanted it to be tested. According to Ding's diary the reports on the testing of this vaccine were sent on 20 November 1942 to Berlin and on page 39 of the German Document Book XII it says that on 18 February 1943 — in other words a Quarter of a year later — there was a directive on the part of the Medical Inspector of the Luftwaffe in which the typhus vaccines are listed which are permissible in the Luftwaffe.

Q: Mr. President, the directive that Dr. Rose just mentioned I have in Rose Document Book II. This is Rose Document No. 26 which I put in as Rose Exhibit No. 19. This is the instructions for troop doctors from the Medical Inspectorate of the Luftwaffe and is on page 55 and 56 of Document Book Rose II, dated 18 February 1943. I have put in the original of this as evidence and inclosed in my document book a copy of it. Please continue, Professor.

A: In elucidation of this document let me draw your attention to the date — 16 February 1943 — page 55 of the document book. Under number 7 you find there the directive regarding typhus vaccines. From "a" to "j" ten different vaccines are listed, vaccines both from Germany and foreign institutes. The Bucharest vaccine is not among these ten. Had I known at that time that this vaccine had been tested and proved valuable in Bucharest, then, of course, I should have recommended, its use just as I recommended the use of Pasteur vaccines from Paris and Tunis.

Moreover, this directive clearly shows that the Medical Inspectorate of the Luftwaffe, who was advised by me, did not. allow itself to be motivated in his views by what had been used in Buchenwald. In this directive a number of vaccines are permitted which were not tested in Buchenwald at all; that is, if one can assume that Ding's diary is correct, which I do not know. Other vaccines which Ding, according to his diary, did test have here been permitted before Ding did test them. In the third group is the -Bucharest vaccine which Ding tested and found useful and it was not permitted for use in the Luftwaffe because the Luftwaffe didn't know the results of the testing.

Q: What other types of vaccines went through your hands during the war?

A: It is, of course, very difficult for me to recall all that went. First of all, vaccines from great institutes — OKH in Cracow, Behring-Werke, Robert Koch Institute, Pasteur Institute in Tunis and Paris, and an Italian institute, Ipsen — Copenhagen Institute. Then I almost forgot the biggest thing that went through my hands during the war. That was the 5,000 doses from Weigl Institute at Lemburg at the time that this institute was still in Russian hands, in the Winter of 1939-1940. And particularly in the case of this vaccine I must be particularly happy that none had hit on the idea of testing it in Buchenwald because I turned this vaccine over to the Robert Koch Institute and it was carried on for a long time under my name because I had paid for it and it took a long while before the money was made available to repay me. Consequently this went under the name of Rose vaccine and if Ding had known about this then there would have been been vaccines mentioned in his diary and that would have been a little too many. God be praised nobody hit on that idea.

Q: When listing the vaccines that went through you hands during the war, you mentioned also the Copenhagen vaccine. Ding's Diary says about this vaccine, specifically on page 53 of Document Book 12, that it was tested on your incentive and the witness Kogon said the same thing on the basis of statements that he alleges Ding made to him. The prosecutor then construed this incentive on your part as a concrete proposal on your part which lead to the death of six persons. The remark of the prosecutor is on page 1330 and 1331 of the German record. Now, what did you have to do with this Copenhagen vaccine?

A: The situation, as I remember it, was as follows. Our needs for typhus vaccine could not be covered no matter what efforts wore made. Therefore, all sorts of offices were in search of new production methods. In this connection Professor Schreiber called my up about this one day — I can't remember exactly when, but it was at a time when he was already the deputy for the combatting of epidemics and consequently concerned himself with such general questions as this. This was in September of 1943 as we have found out later. Schreiber said that of all the vaccine institutes that were under German influence by now the Copenhagen Institute had not participated at all in the production of vaccine so far, although it was one of the best institutes there were. He would like to have this Institute undertake the production of typhus vaccines. The political mood in Denmark, because of the behavior of the German Wehrmacht there, was most inauspicious. Consequently, there was no point in sending a German medical officer there. Therefore, Schreiber asked me whether I would not want to carry on these negotiations as Vice President of the Robert Koch Institute; the prospects would then be somewhat better. Moreover, he knew that I had previously worked in that Institute and knew the local setup, which was a great advantage in conducting such negotiations, I stated my willingness. I got leave from the Luftwaffe, asked for Gildemeister's permission to speak in the name of the Robert Koch Institute and then flew, via Lufthansa, to Copenhagen. This, as we found out later, was on the 23rd of September 1943. Then I visited the director of the Institute, Dr. Oerskov whom I knew personally from before the War.

I asked him if he could and would produce typhus vaccine. Gerskov rejected this request because, as he said, it Was impossible to prevent peoples' falling ill from typhus if you undertook such production and such an occurrence would arouse had blood in Denmark, which Was completely free of typhus. Oerskov's misgivings were brought about because typhus was unknown in Denmark, and nationalistic elements would thus find out that the Institute was producing vaccine for the German government, because there was no need for typhus vaccine in Denmark, since there was no typhus in Denmark; and he was afraid of repercussions from such nationalistic elements; and he, as director of the Institute, had to think not only of the danger to typhus but of the tasks as a whole that the Institute had. I finally had to admit that this was so. Then I was shown Dr. Ipsen's department where he was producing a vaccine from murine virus, not from rickettsia prowazek, which is a lice virus. He explained to me the details of his technique but they are set forth in my report on this trip.

Q: Mr. President, regarding this Copenhagen trip of Dr. Rose I asked a few questions of the director of this Copenhagen Institute. The answers are Rose Document 46, a supplementary Rose document, which I believe the Tribunal has just received. This is Rose Exhibit #20. Regarding the external form of this document, Mr. President, I regret that it does not have the introductory formula requested by the Tribunal, but it has been certified and also certified by the American Embassy. I have also the original document here and it is also specifically stated here that Dr. Oerskov certifies the correctness of the copy. I believe, therefore, that there can be no question about accepting this document in evidence.

MR. HARDY: Your Honor, I haven't received a copy yet. I would like to see a copy of the English.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you exhibit a copy to counsel for the prosecution?

MR. HARDY: No objections, Your Honor.

DR. FRITZ: Mr. President, the interpreters have no copy either. Might I perhaps show the original to the interpreters for a moment?

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now recess. You can have the document before the interpreters in the morning.

The Tribunal will now recess until 9:30 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(A recess was taken until 0930 hours, 22 April 1947)