1947-05-22, #3: Doctors' Trial (afternoon)

AFTERNOON SESSION (The hearing reconvened at 1330 hours, 22 May 1947.)

THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.

THE PRESIDENT: Counsel may proceed.

HERMANN BECKER-FREYSENG — Resumed

DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued)

DR. MARX (Counsel for the Defendant Becker-Freyseng): I shall now continue with the direct examination of the witness, Dr. Becker-Freyseng, with permission of the Tribunal.

BY DR. MARX:

Q: Witness, a little while ago you were describing the physiological fundamental ideas which prompted you, and which constituted the basis for the experiments. May I ask you now to take up the threads once more and continue with the descriptions of this morning.

A: Before the noon recess I shortly stated that the main danger in sea emergencies is that the ship-wrecked person in a completely dried out state after having suffered thirst for a number of days, is drinking sea water. And I further said that according to the agreement made by all experts in this field, the person in this dried out state suffers considerably and that his organism can therefore also be considerably damaged. The danger of Berkatit was seen by us in the following: The berkatit, a sugar like drug which has the capacity to do away with the bitter and salty taste of sea water and to convert the sea water into a perfectly drinkable liquid. The person in sea emergencies with the aid of Berkatit will be able to prepare a certain amount of drinkable sea water. Since, however, Berkatit does not change the salt content of the sea water, the ship wrecked person after some time will, of course, become thirsty and again with the aid of his Berkatit will try to drink sea water. He again introduces a considerable amount of salt into his body which must again be eliminated from his body and, since, by and large, the water which is mingled with the salt is not sufficient, he will get more and more thirsty as time goes on and thereby will begin to drink increasingly larger amounts of sea water mixed with Berkatit.

As soon as he starts drinking more than 300 cubic centimeters at one time diarrhea will or must ensue. Not only will he lose water through the bladder but also as a result of diarrhea. This means that the thirst condition increases and at the same time the danger of being thirsty.

One could naturally say that one could prescribe exactly how much sea water can be drunk mixed with Berkatit. There is no need for a long discussion in stating that a shipwrecked person finding himself in an ocean full of sea water which he allegedly can make potable, by the use of Berkatit, can not be credited with a sufficient amount of self discipline in actually adhering to this dose as it was officially prescribed. At any rate, such an assumption can not be made the point of departure of any military directive. This is the big danger of Berkatit in the sea emergency practice. Entirely different, however, are the conditions for the Berkatit experiment. If I start to speak about the experiment which we carried out without much a do, the situation was as follows:

During this experiment the entire amount of sea water with or without berkatit had been determined beforehand. The amount of the individual dosage was pre-determined in such a manner that in no case could diarrhea result. That was very simple because only had to keep the individual dosage under 300 cubic centimeters. In addition, there was always a physician present during the experiment, who was in a position to observe and judge the condition of the experimental subject and could always interrupt at any moment this artificial sea distress condition by simply giving again normal water to each experimental subject. There is a very clear and absolutely logical difference for the expert between the application of Berkatit during the actual experience of sea distress where the shipwrecked person is swimming in his rubber boat somewhere in the middle of the ocean all alone and the experiment under permanent adequate medical control and exact predetermined conditions which take into consideration all of the dangers I just described. During the conference on 19 and 20 May 1944, in order to revert back to our original document, I had to instruct the technicians and engineers, who also were participants in this meeting, about the matter as I just described it. Very soon I noticed that I had described it in such a way as to really make it clear to the engineers what the danger of Berkatit actually meant. For very understandable propagandistic reasons I therefore painted the danger extremely black. I told these engineers that we medical men very well know the extremely serious consequences of thirst and the loss of water. We know it from a very dangerous sickness, namely, the cholera. In order to avoid any later misunderstanding I may now state that naturally there is considerable difference between the consequences of sea water and the thirst and the cholera. I gave this example, only to remind these people of cholera, since particularly during this illness continuous diarrhea results, and a great loss of water ensues as a result of these diarrhea attacks, which in turn provokes serious disturbances in the organisms which may lead to death. I quoted verbatim during this meeting, what we knew about the loss of water in the case of cholera as contained in the text book of internal medicine by Bergmann.

I at that time was in the possession of that book and I had read it through before. I am even now in a position to read to you the same passages.

Q: Witness, you were just speaking of Bergmann's text book. I shall have it handed to you and I may ask you to read the passages to which you have just referred into the record.

A: We are concerned with the text book for internal medicine by Assmann, Bachmann and Gustav Von Bergmann and a number of other professors, published by Julius Springer, Berlin Edition of 1942 —

MR. HARDY: May it please your Honors, it seems to me that this technical argument concerning the qualities of the Berka method is rather extensive and it seems to me that the defendant can get to the issues involved in this case without going through all of this technical argument and discussion. No doubt there is room for a considerable amount of this discussion here. However, he has covered quite a bit of ground now and the issue in the case is whether or not the experiments were performed, whether or not they were performed on non-volunteers and whether or not the experiments were criminal in their essence, and there are three factors in the experiments, one is the Schaeffer method which was followed out and the other was the Berka method, and the defendant has testified the Berka method was more dangerous, and I don't see what other matter is necessary now to get this matter before the Tribunal.

THE PRESIDENT: I would ask the counsel for the defendant just what the purpose is of pursuing this particular phase of the interrogation any further. The Tribunal might well be convinced that the Schaeffer method for purifying sea water making it potable was the better method and that it was the method that was followed. This method was adopted and this defendant is charged with having carried it out to the prejudice of certain experimental subjects. Now just what is the purpose of reading from this book, counsel?

DR. MARX: Mr. President and Gentlemen of the Tribunal we are here concerned with the following: The Prosecution charges the defendant that he in knowledge of the alleged danger of Berkatit has used this drug and permitted it to be used during the execution of the experiments. The witness says that there can be no question of any danger incurred as a result of Berkatit if the experiment is guided accordingly from a medical and scientific point of view. This book will prove that the statements by Dr. Freyseng are supported from a physiological point of view by medical authorities, including Professor Bergmann, and the other authors who participated in compiling that text book. I shall only read this passage into the record for the purpose of identification and for the purpose of later argumentation. This is merely a short passage which tends to confirm the testimony of the defendant. Furthermore, I shall endeavor to do everything possible to limit the testimony as much as possible.

THE PRESIDENT: The text of a recognized authority may of course be used in argument, but if counsel desires the witness to read only a short passage from the book he may read that.

DR. MARX: Thank you, Your Honor.

WITNESS: We are only concerned with four sentences. I quote on page 28 of the book I just mentioned:

Considerable loss of water through the intestines has to occur to a considerable extent during asiatic cholera but also during gastro enteritis can lead within a few hours to the most severe drying of the body tissues. Soon psychological disturbances occur, fatigue, a feeling of heat in the face, numbness and apathy. If the water in the tissues is decreased by ten per-cent considerable disturbances already occur. Decrease of the water content up to 20 or 22 percent has death has its result.

Q: Is that all?

A: Yes, I think that I either quoted this passage verbatim or indicated it to them in order to convince the engineers present about the danger of Berkatit. Layman who heard this matter for the first time considered it first to be an unpleasant symptom from the subjective point of view but it was my task to put the purely objective danger of this procedure to these people. I think that my description rather impressed these people. Everything contained in this document No. 177, Prosecution Exhibit 132 is an oral repetition of parts of this text book by Bergmann.

A: May I now refer you to another point in this document to which I shall have to take a position. In this connection, Dr. Schaefer is said to have stated that death would have to be expected after a period of twelve days. This period of twelve days, to a certain extent, was a necessary exaggeration. These twelve days referred to the expected loss of water, referring to a very definite experimental subject from the experimental series of Professor Sirany. At any rate, I succeeded with these rather pronounced arguments on the occasion of the preliminary conference of the 19th of May that Berkatit was not introduced as contrary to what the Technical Office had already decided, but that further experiments would be carried out concerning that question. It says in this letter, I quote:

As a result of this pre-discussion, it was agreed upon that new experiments over short periods of time be started.

While according to Document NO 184, Exhibit 132, dated the 15th of May, 1944, the Technical Office was determined to introduce Berkatit, I had at least succeeded in dissuading this Technical Office from decision.

Q: Witness, how did it happen that in spite of your reasons given from the medical point of view, this office still insisted on using Berkatit and didn't drop it? From this report we see no reason for the attitude adopted by that office.

A: After I finished my lecture, one of the engineers present stated that Professor Eppinger of Vienna had examined the Berka procedure and had considered it to be reliable. Professor Eppinger is one of the leading German internists and with such support the Technical Office was naturally successful in opposing me. On the other hand, of course, I could not contradict the internationally renowned authority of Professor Eppinger.

Q: Witness, the witness continues on page 2 and I quote:

In order to determine these experimental series a commission will have to meet, who, during the conference on the 20th of May, 1944, should be agreed upon in collaboration with the OKM.

Does this formulation correspond to what actually happened and why was it necessary for a later commission to meet?

A: It is correct that on the 19th or the 20th of May, 1944, it was decided to arrange for a commission to meet on the 25th of May, which was five days later, in order to determine the conditions for the experiment. On the 19th of May, therefore, neither the experimental series themselves nor the commission were known, who were to determine the conditions for these experiments. The members of this commission were only appointed on the 20th of May in the presence of the representatives of the Navy and, only on the 25th of May, 1944, the experiments were actually discussed and the conditions determined in such a way as they were actually carried out later.

Q: Witness, the statements which you just made are contrary to what can be seen from the next sentences in the document. According to which a certain program for the experiment was already worked out on the 20th of May. It says there that definite experimental series were determined. I'm not going to read these experimental series because they are already known to the Tribunal. Would you please define your attitude towards that, witness?

A: The experimental conditions, as they were stated on page 2 of the photostat copy under II, 1 and 2, do in no way correspond to what five days later was determined. They do not correspond to what actually happened when the experiments were carried through. Beyond that, they do not correspond to what was actually said about those experiments on the 19th or 20th of May '44. In addition, that becomes apparent, from the following, very clearly. A few lines above it says:

In order to determine these experimental series, a commission is to meet, which during the discussions of the 20th of May, 1944, together with the OKM, which is the High Command of the Navy, is to be determined.

Then the letter continues:

The experimental series are to comprise the following:

Whoever was the author of that letter, how could he know on the 19th, what the commission which was only be appointed on the 20th would decide on the 25th. Beyond that, the author of that letter was not even a physician. Otherwise he wouldn't have been able to entertain any such thoughts. This man was merely a technician who probably never in his life has performed a medical experiment. You were, furthermore, asking me why such a commission was necessary and why the experimental conditions couldn't have been determined already on the 20th. That had the following reasons. During the conferences on the 20th of May besides a very young captain of the Navy, who had heard about this problem for the first time in his life, only Dr. Schaefer and I were present as physicians. Since both of us, however, were member of the Luftwaffe Medical Service and since the Technical Office wanted Dr. Eppinger to represent them during that conference, and, since furthermore the Navy wanted a representative too, it is clear that we were not in a position to determine the conditions for the experiments among both of us, but that the Navy and the Technical Office urged that the experimental conditions be determined in the presence of their representatives.

Q: Witness, in that case I can say that the conference of the 25th of May, 1944, would have been entirely superfluous, even senseless, if, on the 19th and the 20th of May, such decisions about the experimental conditions had already been made. In other words, it was to depend upon the presence of Eppinger and a number of other well known scientists to decide upon the final conditions for the experiments? Is that correct?

A: Yes, that is correct.

Q: The conditions for these medical experiments could only be determined by the medical representatives of the respective agencies. Who was to be assigned for that purpose from the different agencies?

A: That can be seen on page 3 of the original document which I have before me in photostat form. It says that the commission was to include Professor Eppinger, Vienna; representatives of the agency of the Chief of the Medical Service; representatives of the Technical Office; and representatives of the High Command of the Navy, OKM.

Q: Didn't you discuss experiments at all on the 19th of May?

A: Naturally, experiments were discussed. I told them in a very general and understandable way for all the laymen present there, and without going into any physiological or experimental questions that a number of experimental groups would have to be set up if this question could be solved experimentally at all. I approximately said what would be to carry out such an experimental series. I certainly said that one group would have to be treated with the Berkatit procedure, and I certain must have mentioned that it would be expedient for purposes of comparison to leave out one group entirely, and naturally I also must have said that it would be necessary to have a so-called control group to which normal drinking water was to be given. What, however, I certainly did not say was that a number of experimental groups should be limited to six days at the most, and on the other hand no experimental group should be limited to 12 days. The aim of these experiments, after all, was to determine the time during which Berkatit sea water could be consumed. If I must for once assume the credit which was granted me by the Prosecution initially to the effect that they admitted that I was young, but to a certain extent an experienced scientist, I will assume it here. I never suggested any such experimental nonsense, and never would have done so. If I carry out an experiment in order to find out the tolerance of an experimental subject towards a certain drug for any particular length of time, it lacks the most primitive logic to determine already at the very beginning how long this experiment is to last. If so I could have saved myself the entire experiment. The time as to how long these experiments could or should be carried through naturally primarily depends upon the amount of sea water consumed. Now, this so-called "Minutes" of this discussion was laid down by a layman, and only a complete layman is in a position to derive merely from the fact that one drinks sea water daily, can derive a danger from the fact that one drinks sea water daily. Any such statement can only have sense and reason if it is stated how much sea water is to be consumed during that time.

If, for instance, it was said here; people consumed 500 cubic centimeters, or 10000 cubic centimeters daily, or any other figure, and if there had been stated that under this special experimental condition the expected duration of the experiment is so and so many days, then this statement would have the merit of a certain amount of sense. It constitutes, of course, a tremendous amount of difference whether I carry out the experiment with a slight amount of sea water or an enormous amount of sea water; but do let me point to the following in this document; under I, "a" it is stated, and I quote:

People nourished with Berka sea water procedure.

A little further below it says,

Period of experiment 6 days at the most.

Immediately underneath it says,

People to whom sea water and Berkatit was introduced—

and so forth, and then it says,

Period of the experiment 12 days.

Had I suggested an experiment to last over 12 days then I certainly wouldn't know why I should have suggested the other experiment to last only six days. Whatever I could have derived from the experiment which allegedly should take 12 days, would have also included what would have happened in the first six days of this entire period of 12 days. For any physician who has only the most primitive imagination of an experiment it is entirely out of the question to read any sense out of this so-called experimental plan.

In conclusion, I may say that neither on the occasion of the conference of the 20 or 25 of May in the presence of Professor Eppinger, any time limits were determined throughout which the experiments were to be conducted, or when these experiments were to be interrupted, because these very dates were to be exceeded experimentally, isn't that correct?

A: Yes, that is true.

Q: Witness, during these negotiations and during the negotiation of the 19th of May 1944 was there any mention made of the selection of the experimental subjects; was it said expressly that these were to be furnished by the Reichsfuehrer SS?

A: This proposal was not made on the 19th of May 1944. At that time I stated approximately the following, I said that the experiments which had now once more become necessary should naturally be carried through under the responsibility of the chief of the Medical Services for undoubtably we are here concerned with a medical matter. In February or March 1944 I had performed my own experimental work in Berlin. To be sure at that time I didn't work on human experimental persons, but on animals, but at that time I was active in my medical research institute, and experienced the enormous difficulties which conditioned the execution of scientific work under the stress of daily air attacks on Berlin. I therefore knew exactly just how difficult any execution of experiments was in the summer of 1944 and in particular in Berlin. In addition it was clear to me approximately how many persons would have to be secured for this experiment if it was to be carried through. I think that at that time I estimated that about 20 or 30 experimental subjects would be needed. During the conference of the 25th we have found out that we would need approximately 40 experimental subjects for that purpose. In addition it was clear to me that the experiment would have to be continued for about 4 weeks without any interruption because before the sea water experiment proper and after the sea water experiment proper, the experiment subjects would have to undergo a pre or after-observation. For that reason I considered it my duty to point out to the participants in the meeting on the 19, 20 and 25 that it would probably be extremely difficult to get the necessary experimental subjects for such experiments.

We did not have the basic order in the Luftwaffe to the effect that soldiers were not to be used for experiments, as it existed in the army. Extremely often we used soldiers for experiments. I became increasingly difficult to get such soldiers for any length of time and I thought it to be out of the question to get forty soldiers for such an experiment from anywhere. The same was true in the case of patients in hospitals. At the end of 1943 or beginning of 1944 a number of regulations had been issued by the O.K.W. to the effect that the stay in military hospitals of soldiers was to be limited to the smallest extent and as far as it could be justified medically, which meant that not even this possibility could be considered.

The Prosecution asked Generaloberstabsarzt [Chief Medical Officer] Prof. Schroeder during the cross examination whether he considered it possible that in the year of 1944 — whether we could obtain 40 experimental subjects in Berlin, a city of four and a half million inhabitants. Germany in the year of 1944 was admist total warfare. Anyone who has not experienced that war on his own body can not grasp the situation which then prevailed.

From the point of view of personnel, the situation at that time was such that practically every man capable to bear arms had been drafted into the Wehrmacht and all others, even women had been used for some kind of labor. Even the youths, fifteen or sixteen years old, were used as either ack-ack [anti-aircraft] assistants or in the labor service.

Naturally in Berlin, considering the four and one half million inhabitants we could have raised 40 people on which we could have performed these experiments, but who would they have been? At the most, we could have gotten some women, who were inspired by a will to sacrifice themselves, or some ill people, or some young boys and girls of a very youthful age. These were all experimental subjects who in no way could have conformed to the conditions.

Experimental subjects, who had the corresponding age, no one could have found in the year of 1944 and none of them could have received leave for four weeks from their office or work place.

Q: Well, how was the thought finally entertained to use prisoners for these experiments?

A: On the 19th of May I pointed out these difficulties briefly, the difficulties I have just described and on 19th May this question remained open. Then immediately after the discussion ended, while I was still in Christensen's office or in the corridor, I talked to one or several of the engineers who had been present and one of us pointed out that at that time in Berlin companies of prisoners were used to clear away debris of buildings which had been destroyed by bombs. That was something that was familiar to everyone in Berlin at that time and the prisoners, who were seen at that time in their striped suits were the very people whom we could use for our experiments. Every Berliner saw in the streets in those days these young men, twenty, thirty or forty years of age, healthy strong and capable of work. One of us, maybe it was myself, I don't remember, remarked that those were the people from whom one could get a few volunteers for such an experiment.

Now, the referent of Christensen, Stabs-Engineer Schickler, referred to this remark in the meeting on 20th of May and asked me as it is stated in this record, since he had consulted me about the meeting of the 19th and since he himself said it was very difficult to get experimental subjects. Schickler asked me something like this: "Dr. Becker-Freyseng, yesterday we discussed another possibility to get out of this difficulty of finding experimental subjects; would you present your idea to those present in this meeting again?" I said that I considered it possible, if all other sources for experimental subjects dried up, we could ask the competent authorities for prisoners for experimental subjects.

I said that was up to the chief of the Medical Service, but we would try to have the experiments carried out in our own office with our own people and if that was not possible, we would try to find other subjects. That was assuming that the discussion on the 25th of May actually came to the conclusion that the experiments were actually to be carried out.

Q: Witness, how do you feel about the explanation given by the person who drew up this report for the chart of the laboratory in Dachau?

A: You probably mean the basis, since the chief of the medical service expects certain damage to health and therefore people should be taken from a concentration camp.

Q: Yes, that is the basis I mean.

A: Here the non-medical writer of this report has confused two or even three things which have nothing to do with one another. First of all he has confused the danger of Berkatit in practice with the absolute safety of the same drug in an experiment. And then he confused this whole matter with purely organizational difficulties. In the summer of 1944 in Germany finding forty healthy young men as subjects for an experiment which would last four weeks and besides I think that this man did not realize what he was writing. And, as a laymen there is perhaps something sensational in having to do with the subject of human experiments.

Q: Witness, I go on in the document. I skip the next paragraph. It speaks for itself. The next two sentences on page 3 of the document I shall quote:

In regard to the silver problem GL/C — E 5 IV will determine whether the necessary amount of silver is available. With GL/C-B 5 it is to be determined whether the same quantities will be required as heretofore.

Will you please comment on that?

A: Yes, I can comment very briefly because I have referred to it before. At the time of this meeting I said that the alleged 2.5 to 3 tons of silver required was a gross exaggeration and the technical office had to admit that and promised to check the affair again.

Q: Then what can you say in conclusion on the point of the document?

A: The whole document?

Q: Yes, I mean this last passage. You have already spoke about the rest of it.

A: It is the admission of the technical office that the 2.5 to 3 tons of silver is an exaggeration.

Q: You have said already that would be necessary only for the first equipment.

A: Yes.

Q: Now, I come to the second part of the document dealing with the conference of the 20 May 1944. The list of participants is on page one of the document. I should like to ask you did you know these men who came from the Navy?

A: No, I knew none of these Navy men and I did not know, as the document indicates, that the technical office of the Luftwaffe had previously discussed the same subject with the Navy because it is shown here that Schickler reported about the work done since the last discussion. Since we had no discussion previously with the technical office it could only be discussions with the Navy which were carried on behind our back.

Q: Witness I shall now quote the first paragraph:

At the main conference on 20 May 1944, Captain Eng. (Stabsingenieur) Dr. Schickler reports on work done since the last conference especially regarding the results of the preliminary discussion described in part No. I.

You have just said that Mr. Schickler spoke at the second meeting. Now I would like to ask you — it says here that he reported on work done since the last conference especially regarding the results of the preliminary discussion. Did you know of any conference before the one of 20 May 1944?

A: No, I just said that I had known of no discussion between the technical office and the Navy.

Q: No the next paragraph contains the Navy's point of view. It said that the Navy considered it important to introduce the method immediately, and wants to find something good for three to five days. What do you have to say about that?

A: I must go back to page one of the document briefly. Under number 4 there is a Marine Stabsarzt [Staff Surgeon] Dr. Laurens who came from the office of the Commander Admiral of Submarines in Kiel. The Navy had planned if possible to get all the drinking water supplies for the submarines by one of the new methods developed by the Luftwaffe. Since a submarine is at sea for longer than three to five days it is obvious that this statement were proof that the writer failed to understand the problem. Not only every Navy expert but everyone else who thinks this matter through carefully will agree with me no doubt if I say that precisely in the Navy there is great interest in finding such a process.

While the Luftwaffe had only very small life boats in its planes, rubber life rafts, the Navy and the Submarines have life boats which are much larger, where 50, 60 or even 100 people can use them. One need merely open any book reporting a ship wreck, one will see that such life boats of the Navy are often 30 or 40 days at sea before they reach land. The English who have been seafaring people for centuries have many very clear reports on that subject. If the Luftwaffe wishes ship wrecks of course within a certain limitation from the land base and have been satisfied with three to five days this limitation of three to five days would have no sense for the Navy at all. I don't know what the writer was thinking, at least he didn't write down what was actually said.

Q: Now, did the Navy consider Sirany's experiments sufficient?

A: That is given here in this document and in the second place, at least, the representatives of the Navy who were present said they would consider Sirany's experiments sufficient. In addition to this Stabsarzt Laurens. None of them were doctors. I shall explain later that certain people in the Navy did not think these experiments adequate but during this discussion representatives of the Navy said Sirany's experiments were adequate.

Q: Now, I come to the next problem, and I quote:

These series of experiments should be finished and reported on not later than the end of June. During this period all preparations are to be made for the commencement of production according to the Berka method at a date not later than July 1st 1944, and also, if the I.G. method should be introduced, for the start of the construction of the necessary manufacturing equipment by the I.G.

Can you comment on this. Were these points discussed in this form during this conference?

A: No, and if they had been discussed I would have objected so violently that they would probably not be given in here, but maybe they would be.

On the first of July the Berka method is to be in production. At the same time the beginning of the construction of the manufacturing equipment is to be begun for the other method. This indicates to me the whole prejudice and unpractical spirit of the person who wrote this.

Q: The next paragraph deals with the people on this commission you have just mentioned who were to meet later and determine the series of experiments. Is this list of the member of the commission here, correct?

A: Yes, no names are now except Professor Eppinger. It is hardly possible to make any mistakes, therefore. I may point out the following:

As representative of the Medical Service Stabsarzt Dr. Becker-Freyseng is provided.

That was the opinion or perhaps the wish of this office. In reality my departmental chief was present on the 25th. I was with him, that is true. Besides after I had reported to my departmental chief when I returned to the office he said that we would ask two other scientists to participate at this meeting. First, the Professor for Pharmacology at the University of Berlin — Professor Heubner, and the Professor for Physiological Chemistry at the University at Kiel-Professor Nette. Then it gives here as representative of the Navy Professor Orzichowski. Unfortunately the Navy informed Professor Orzichowski so late that he did not attend the meeting himself. I may also point out that this second discussion on the 25th was on the order of my departmental chief in Berlin. While it was originally to take place in Munich because of Professor Eppinger who had to come all the way from Vienna since my departmental chief wanted to be present at this meeting himself, since Professor Heuber from Berlin who was to be present and Professor Nette from Kiel, it was more sensible to have the discussion at Berlin — which happened.

Q: Now, witness, what about the sentence in parentheses which mentions a telephone conversation which you are supposed to have had on the basis of which the place of the meeting was changed from Munich to Berlin, do you recall anything about this telephone conversation?

A: Yes, I remember this telephone call but it could have been at the earliest one day after the meeting, that is on the 21st. And I don't know how it could be put in an alleged record of what happened on the 20th.

Q: Then, again in your opinion this is again proof how lightheartedly this record was drawn up and that it does not give the real course of the thing.

A: Normally that would have had to be a supplement to this record.

Q: Witness, the report goes on to say. I quote:

Dachau was determined as the place of the experiments.

Who determined that and what do you have to say about it?

A: Nobody determined it and nobody could determine it. There was not a single representative of any officer there who had anything to do with concentration camps. That would have had to be a representative of a high Police Agency of the Reichsfuehrer-SS or the Reich Ministry of Interior. It is quite possible that that is based on the following mistakes or the following facts: Everyone present realized that experiments with prisoners could not be performed in any prison or penitentiary and probably one of the people present wondered how this would be done technically. Then I no doubt told him what I knew — that I knew there were laboratories in Dachau and that I could imagine that if one could obtain prisoners the experiments could be performed in the laboratory rooms of the camp at Dachau. I knew of them because of the Nurnberg Sea Distress and Cold meeting.

Q: Had you ever been in Dachau yourself?

A: No, I have never been in Dachau.

Q: Now, witness, the next sentence in the document says that you did get in touch with Professor Eppinger and the Reichsfuehrer SS, is that correct?

A: It is a fact anyhow that Professor Eppinger was informed by our office probably by telegram or telephone to the Vienna Medical office, and I assume that the writer of this report did not mean that I did get in touch with the Reichsfuehrer-SS personally because I did not know Mr. Himmler.

He probably means that if any contact was necessary it would be established through the office of the Chief of the Medical Service to which I belonged.

Q: Did you not say that the responsibility for the planning and execution of the experiments would have to be with the Chief of the Medical Service?

A: In view of the experiments which Mr. von Sirany had carried out on his own initiative, and because of the various other experiences with the Technical Office which are testified to by the affidavit of Dr. Heinrich Rose which has been offered in evidence, I said that these experiments were a purely medical matter and therefore would, of course, fall under the responsibility of a medical office.

Q: Witness, it is now necessary to discuss the distribution list of this document. Please look at it and tell me whether the offices listed there were actually concerned with the questions discussed at these meetings, or interested in them, at least?

A: First, there are three Navy offices about which I know nothing, but since the Navy was represented I assume that these offices were interested. The Research Institute of the RDL and OBDL was the Luftwaffe agency concerned with technical research. Since I was not referent for research at the time I don't know whether the referent Dr. Bensinger was interested or not. Later, from the files which I took over, I saw that this office had nothing to do with the problem. Then it lists L. In. 16. That was the Inspectorate of the Luftwaffe, No. 16. It was the inspectorate for distress at sea which was, of course, interested.

Q: Now come the offices which were to get this document for their information: How about them?

A: First, it lists three offices about which I know for certain that they had nothing to do with the problem. That is, the Medical Experimentation and Instruction Division of the Air Force at Jueterbog; the Testing Institute of the Luftwaffe at Rechlin; and the Institute for Aviation Medicine of the D.V.L., Berlin-Adlershef. I need not go into that in detail now, but I can say for certain that these three offices never dealt with problems of sea distress, and I don't know why they are listed. I should like to point out briefly the next office is L. In. 14. That means the office of the Chief of the Medical Service of the Luftwaffe. The change of name had occurred at least six months before. The text speaks of the Chief of the Medical Service, but here it gives the old name, and then, under L. In. 14, a number of subsections are listed.

Part of them had nothing to do with the subject at all, and it was not customary to prescribe to another agency which departments, referats, etc., were to be given a certain assignment. Then comes the Reichsfuehrer SS with whom the Technical Office, as Document No. 184, Exhibit 132, has shown had been in contact behind our back, behind the back of the Chief of the Medical Service, and finally, the Technical Academy in Vienna which was not, as Mr. McHaney assumed, Professor Eppinger's office, but the office where Berka had carried but his experiments.

Q: Then, what conclusions can you draw about this person who drew up the distribution list?

A: I can only say, because a number of agencies are listed which had nothing whatever to do with the problem, but that the agency to which Dr. Schaefer belonged, the Aviation Research Institute, is not listed; that old names were included shows, at least that this distribution list was not drawn up with the necessary thoroughness.

Q: And I may add, knowledge of the subject?

A: Yes.

Q: Then witness, I can say that the document which we have just discussed contains numerous incorrect statements, distortions, and considerable nonsense. When did you for the first time observe all these incorrect things? Here in Nurnberg or earlier?

A: That was earlier. The letter was signed on the 23rd of May, 1944. Since our office was about 50 kilometers south of Berlin and we received everything through the mail or by courier, I assume that we got the letter on the 25th of 26th or 27th. In any case, I know that I did not get the letter, because it had to go through official channels in our office too, until after the discussion of the 25th of May. After the conditions for the experiment had been settled in the presence of Professor Eppinger and Professor Heubner and other people. Then I suggested to my department chief that a written answer should be sent to the office which had sent out this report, pointing out the many mistakes.

Unfortunately, my suggestion was not accepted. It was said that the discussion on the 25th had shown how the experiments were actually to be carried out; I thought that the contents of this document were obsolete; and, in the summer of 1944, there were more important things to do than to waste paper. On the next occasion, however, I told either Christensen, personally, or his representative, Schickler, either by telephone or personally, that I had found a number of mistakes in this document, and I asked them if they issued another such document to have it signed before hand by some office which knew something about the subject.

Q: Mr. President, in this connection I wanted to offer an affidavit of the person in charge of these conferences and the signer of this document, Ober-Engineer Christensen, which Mr. Christensen gave me personally in the English camp of Neuengamme. Unfortunately, this important document has not been translated yet and, therefore, I am unable to offer it in evidence. But, in view of the fact that this is perhaps the most important document in my entire case, I ask for permission to submit this Christensen affidavit later in a supplementary document book as soon as the English translation is available. I should like to take the liberty of pointing out that Christensen fully confirms everything that the witness has just testified, especially the fact that this document was written down by memory by Mr. Schickler at least three days after the meeting of the 20th of May for the purposes of the Technical Office, and that there was no shorthand record during the meeting. I do not want to say anything else, but I should like to have permission to submit the document later.

MR. HARDY: May it please Your Honor, I request that the comment of counsel concerning the Christensen affidavit be stricken from the record until such time as the affidavit is presented in court.

THE PRESIDENT: The comment of counsel is immaterial. The document may be offered as soon as the translation is ready. If the document be not offered, the comment of counsel will be stricken.

DR. MARX: I beg your pardon. I should like to remark one thing. It is three weeks since we sent the document in for translation. I assume that the Language Division is over-worked. That is the only explanation I can think of. I am very sorry, but in this matter I certainly don't bear the blame.

THE PRESIDENT: (Interrupting): Nothing I said was meant as any reflection upon counsel. Simply the fact that a comment on a document to be offered in the future is entirely immaterial. I am entirely aware that the Translation Division is behind in its work and it is no fault of counsel at all.

DR. MARX: May it please the Tribunal, I shall continue with my interrogation of the witness.

Q: Witness, what did you do after these two meetings of the 19 and 20 of May 1944?

A: These two meetings took place in Berlin. After the meeting on the 20th I went back to my office, which as I have said was about 50 kilometers south of Berlin in Saalow. I immediately reported to my top chief, Oberstarzt [Colonel, Medical Corps.] Dr. Maerz, about which meetings he decided that Professor Eppinger should be informed immediately. He also decided that Professor Heuoner and Professor Nette should be asked to attend the conference as experts for the Chief of the Medical Service. He also decided that he himself would attend the meeting on the 25th, and I believe it was on the evening of the 21st of May, possibly as late as the 22nd. That I called up Dr. Schäfer in Berlin and asked him to inform Professor Heubner and asked him to attend the meeting on the 25th. That was because I knew that Dr. Schäfer knew Heubner personally, and of course I did not want to call up Professor Heubner by telephone and thought it better if Schäfer would go and ask him personally.

DR. MARX: Your Honor, this Professor Heubner who has just been mentioned is a scientist who still enjoys international renown. In order to show that we offer Becker-Freyseng Document No. 140, on page 4 of Becker-Freyseng Document Book 3. This will be Becker-Freyseng Exhibit 27. It is an excerpt from the German Medical Weekly of 17 January 1947. I quote:

The Constituent Assembly of the Scientific Senate of the German Central Administration for Public Health in the Russian Zone took place in Berlin. The Senate, consisting of leading German scientists and medical practitioners, is an autonomous corporation independent of the central ad ministration, with a self elected Board, and has advisory tasks.

Professor Heubner was elected chairman and Professor Brugsch vice-chairman.

I offer this excerpt as proof of how thoroughly the question of whether these experiments were necessary was examined.

Q: Witness, what was the essential content of the discussion of the 25th of May?

A: My department chief an I hoped that it would result from this conference that no further experiments would be necessary. Consequently, the first question put before the professors, that is Professor Eppinger, Professor Heubner and Professor Nette, was whether they would regard new experiments necessary before Berkatit should be introduced.

Q: Witness, did you yourself consider further experiments necessary? You remember that the Prosecution at one time said that this question could have been solved by a chemist in one afternoon?

A: I don't consider the problem so simple that a chemist could have solved it in one afternoon, but perhaps I may come back to that later. I myself did not consider further experiments necessary. That can be seen from everything that I have already said on the subject. Moreover I should like to point out that the representative of the office of the Chief of the Medical Service at the meeting of the 25th was not myself, but my Department Chief, who was an Oberstarzt.

Q: Was that Dr. Maerz?

A: Yes, Dr. Maerz.

Q: For what reasons did you later participate in the planning and preparation for the experiments, if you yourself did not consider them necessary?

A: That I did not consider these experiments necessary was my own private scientific opinion.

On the basis of my position I thought it was my duty, however, to participate in the planning and preparation of these experiments.

Q: Witness, can you explain these official reasons or considerations which you just mentioned?

A: I shall try to do so briefly. One must make a distinction between medical reasons, economic or technical reasons, and military reasons.

DR. MARX: Mr. President, this explanation will take some time. I should like to take the liberty of suggesting that we adjourn now, because I personally am still suffering a little from pains in my foot and would be very grateful if I could sit down.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will be in recess until 9:30 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Thereupon a recess was taken until 9:30 o'clock May 23, 1947.)