1947-03-05, #2: Doctors' Trial (late morning)
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the courtroom will please find their seats. The Tribunal is again in session.
KARL GEBHARDT — Resumed DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued)
BY DR. SEIDL:
Q: Witness, when and under what circumstances was the order issued that the effectiveness of sulfonamides was to be tested in an experiment?
A: This order arose from the discussions of a military nature, whose nature and whose observations to a large group of persons I have taken the liberty of describing. The purpose was to avoid all possible injury in the Waffen SS in the future. The two experts, Nebe and Grawitz, opposed my point of view. The purely military assignment given from Hitler directly to Himmler, Nebe brought into the confidence and foreign propaganda. I want to express very carefully here and testify under oath what I know about Nebe. In the absolute conception of authority which I had at that time I had no reason to doubt that these statements were true. Nebe said that there was a crisis of confidence in the troops, first of all because the Allied troops had been given sulfonamide bags -
Q: Witness —
THE PRESIDENT: Will the witness please wait before continuing his evidence until the translator has finished translating the preceding sentence. The conflict of voices is difficult.
WITNESS: I beg your pardon.
BY DR. SEIDL:
Q: You may continue.
A: Himmler's intelligence man, Nebe, brought the attitude from his personal observation that there was a crisis among our wounded men and enlisted men on the one hand and the doctors on the other hand. He used the following two facts in explaining this to Himmler and to us. First of all —
Q: Witness, I believe you must speak a little more slowly. Pause between the sentences.
A: That the Allied troops gave their soldiers sulfonamide bags. This was unknown in the Germany army. Second, that there was a definite propaganda on the radio and the press and hand bills which were dropped, that these miracle drugs which could have protected our wounded men from infection from the beginning, these were discussed in the propaganda.
Q: Witness, these were handbills dropped by the enemy?
A: Yes, which were intended to destroy the morale of the German troops. I stated that I myself did not see this handbill but the intelligence man reported this. On the other hand I was in Spain. Then I know the two possibilities which the Allies had, that the doctors and research were not political, but that the ruthless conduct of the war and a definite war of nerves or Propaganda used the words, sulfonamide, penicillin, and the lag of German science by fifteen years, and so forth, to an extent which no person actually informed about the subject would admit. That was in my opinion the main reason why Himmler asked Grawitz to report on sulfonamides in contrast to me. I mentioned the sulfonamides in my January report as an additional, drug which, for example, had never had any significance in my own clinic, and Grawitz's report at the meeting was not the instigating factor but a purely technical question. Himmler had some possibilities with Switzerland which is not important here, and we received from Switzerland cibazol, which was at that time the best sulfonamide. The report of Grawitz did not have anything to do with our sulfonamide experiments except for the fact it described the problem and the efforts of Dr. Brunner who was an old acquaintance of mine from Saaurbruch and Zurich also had nothing to do with experiments, but, of course, Grawitz used this reference to cibazol from Brunner and he spoke of 109 wounds, 100 of which were healed purely by sulfonamides.
This, of course, made great impression and the bottle neck of transportation from Switzerland, of course, made great difficulty. And, the medical men, technicians, etd., who were concerned had to decide which drag was the most urgent to be introduced. But, there was another unfortunate factor which affected this question — that was the person of one of the speakers who was mentioned in all these meetings, that is Dr. Krueger. Here again I should like to state that Dr. Krueger had as little to do with the actual experiments as any other participant in the meetings, but at every meeting Dr. Krueger spoke of the best results and improvements of thirty to forty percent that were not achieved anywhere else. Unfortunately, Dr. Krueger in peace time was the advising surgeon, the consulting surgeon of the General-SS and Himmler knew him. He was, of course, not called in. We had no knowledge of these discussions but Grawitz quoted him as very important in contrast to my point of view. Then we had another unfortunate factor which made the situation more difficult, the possibility which Rostock had given of blowing sulfonamide into the wounds, which were to my knowledge constructed for the first time in the special apparatus by Surgeon Doctor Schmidt of the Waffen-SS who had served in Russia under Krueger. Grawitz in contrast to my original attitude could bring convincing evidence to Himmler that there was a possibility to use sulfonamide in a preventative way — to prevent infection in the wounds. That is the only question of transport of secondary mortality which was higher than mortality at the front — to solve all questions at one blow. Grawitz was an internist. He came directly from the front without any great evidence of what had been discussed at the meetings. I want to state expressly I do not know whether Grawitz was at the meeting or whether learned from another source. I can only say he know about the problem: that the question of sulfonamide was brought up by Nebe through foreign propaganda; that there was no doubt for Himmler that this was the patent medicine designed to bring him out of his difficulties and that he merely wanted expert opinion from me. The questions to me were very simple. First — am I in position to undertake the responsibility by saying it is senseless to take any great interest in sulfonamide in contrast to the opinion of other countries, the opinion of Grawitz — the Grawitz-Krueger group — because I know the question is settled or can quickly be decided by inquiry.
Of course, I had to answer this question with "No." Then, whether I was of the opinion, in spite of my personal opposition to sulfonamide, because I represented a different school of thought, that in the publications of Brunner, which were shown me, and Krueger which described that, which I do not know in detail, but I know many foreign examples — whether he had to submit a sudden change was possible as one knew the manner of working. I had to answer this question with "Yes." And that was all the collaboration that was asked from me at the time.
Q: What position did the Reich Physician Dr. Grawitz held at the time? As active Reich Physician what influence did he exist?
A: I do not want to fall into the error of speaking of a man whom I always combated or forced into the position where I wanted him and speak against him now when he is dead. We were able to bear him as a superior and there is a limit when a man is dead. But, I can say that Grawitz, had the unique opportunity as savior of the Waffen-SS at the front in contrast to our soldiers, after becoming acquainted with foreign literature and with the remarkable capacity to understand Himmler — things that he wanted to have unsolved —- That is how simple he thought medicine was. This give him the victory, that was to test it with human experiments. I may remind you at this time I shall later comment in more detail on human experiments in another connection. It was so that Racher's first experiment was instructed by Himmler and was reported to the Fuchrer. Hitler decided, which I can only quote what my chief of Staff told me. Himmler, whose veracity I did not doubt at the time, that on principle human experiments were permitted as a question of welfare of the State, not a question up to the doctor — they were protected by law. They were free from punishment. Anyone will be punished who does not carry out a military order. I merely remind you of the fact which every soldier of the last War knows, that criticism which is made at the end of War includes that people in the last War had themselves arrested in time but committed some punishable action and then were imprisoned and could not be wounded and did not die.
I can only repeat what Himmler repeated — that there was an order of the State that some one in the concentration camps or prisoners should not be completely untouched but also German soldiers must do also the things which women and children in the homeland suffering from air raids and bombs. This was not said by the doctor. This was said by me. But this was the opinion of the Head of the State, according to Himmler.
Q: If I understand you correctly, you mean to say that up to this time you have had nothing indirectly to do with the experiments?
A: No. I had nothing to do with them. I shall come back to what I know and did not know about them. But, in this discussion the fact that Himmler was ordering this experiment and that Grawitz as agency for medical care of concentration camps could not discuss it.
Q: Why did you yourself at the time not suggest although you actually had nothing to do with the matter yet, that the effectiveness of sulfonamide be tested by animal experiments or medical observation of the wounded?
A: I was present the whole discussion as a surgeon with experience at the front and, of course, I expressed my opinion. The question of animal experiments was senseless. I might point out that sulfonamides had been tested for about even years in Germany, and that only in 1944, in the last studies, was there any clarification by animal experiments. On the contrary, what we know about infectious diseases, what great difference there is between infectious diseases in animals by artificial infection and infectious diseases in human beings — in the gas gangrene in war, infectious animal experiments, up to eighty and one hundred percent of the cases are cured, and with kreatine, one hundred percent; that in human beings the absolute ineffectiveness has new been clearly proved. It is not so, as I have read, that in our ruthlessness we wanted to skip the subject of animal experiments, but even today animal experiments have been able to give the directions, the connections between certain drugs and certain diseases but that any comparison of animal experiments in these infectious diseases with human infectious diseases is a mistake and leads to false? conclusions. In this long time of thinking and preparations from the time when I was accused until now I have thought if anyone asks: "Why did you not test this on German soldiers in actual cases of wounds?" I did not imagine that any court would ask such an impossible question. One can, of course, confuse two things, and even Mr. Rostock accuses me by saying: "In your clinic with chemistry and bacteriology you wanted to do this, Gebhardt, that criminal, carrying it out on the poor Polish women without any reasons for in his own clinic he had five or six hundred wounded." One can also say, "If I didn't work in the clinic then you wanted to go to the front with special units."
But the last thing that was said, the Allied Armies solved that by way of inquiry. Only the criminal men of the SS carried out a senseless experiment, which they could have solved in another way. I might point out that, for example, in peace times there is no gangrene with very rare exceptions, but there are wounds in peace time which are contaminated with earth. Peace time wounds and war time wounds cannot be compared with each other — that is a scientific negligence. On the other hand, on can say; "If we treat wounds from the beginning with sulfonamides we must come to a solution." Comparison is only possible under comparable conditions. In ten wounds — a hundred wounds at the front there are not two which can be compared with each other according to appearance, according to the damage done. It is a false conclusion to say that one can have comparable conditions at the front, but even if it is possible to find wounds which are more or loss comparable, one man has been marching for ten hours before hand and is exhausted before he is wounded, and the other is hit by a bomb in bed when he is rested. One man lying for ten hours in No-Man's Land and freezes. The secondary conditions at the front are just as different as the type of wounds. There is a great amount of literature on the American side which points out that it is not comparable; that it is not possible at the front, where there is danger, to recommend the same treatment. One man does not find any doctor at all for three days, another finds a bad doctor, another finds a good doctor. One finds a doctor of my school who attacks the problem surgically immediately and, in addition, used some sulfonamide drug. The other, on the other hand, finds an advocate of the sulfonamide theory — had a superficial wound which can be filled with sulfonamides and this has a good effect, but if he has a deep wound with a small opening at the top, then the sulfonamide steps up the wound and this sulfonamide creates great damage.
Therefore, a comparison of wounds, of external conditions, and of therapy at the front is not possible. That was the purpose of all these suggestions for special units and special hospitals. They had two basic requirements. One, that this special staff go to the front lines. Second, that the patients should never be lot out of their hands again. Otherwise, the results cannot be controlled. During the whole war, in-spite of the enormous efforts which the German army took, we did not succeed in getting any clear proof on this line. There remains only the inquiry. I know more or less a statement of the American medical authorities after the war in Africa and in Europe. They had the same experiences as we did. They had to change all their therapeutic suggestions when the theater of war changed. In Narwik in the snow I was able to sew the wound up, put the knife into the snow and, as it was sterile, I could operate again without anything happening. The men in Africa was so affected by the sun that, aside from special cases, he was protected from infection. We had serious infection problems in France but we could rely on a combined treatment because the good reads and air communications could bring the patient in six or eight hours to good hospital care. In Russia in the winter it was different. Every suggestion, every statement, according to the school, was destroyed by the emergency of the Russian winter. Of course, the way of settling a question will always be by inquiry. The Chief of the Wehrmacht Medical & Service always recommended that. But this way leads to a decision only if one has a great deal of time, and very reliable advisers. If I had my way at that time, with my experience at the front and my experience as a surgeon against much younger men, we might have taken a different way.
My views did not prevail. Laymen talking about medicine are not satisfied if one speaks of worries and long term and fate. They want an answer "yes" or "no" immediately. As Himmler at that time wanted information in weeks, all our supplies, all our medical tactics depended on whether we admitted we could not expand the SS because we did not have enough doctors and surgeons and the interest of thousands of German soldiers was put in the foreground — or whether, on the one hand, we were of the opinion that sulfonamide are sufficient, that one drug — such a simple drug that even a ordinary troop doctor can take care of it. Every doctor has his little bag of it and every doctor can put some in the wound and there will be no important cases of infection result. I do not want to defend the justification of these experiments, but there was a great question of thousands of human beings behind it. I personally did not give the initiative for the experiment. I represented a different surgical point of view from the beginning and expressed it afterwards, orally and in writing, and I could not say that the question in itself was more or less solved by me, and above all, as a surgical advisor I could not say anything definite for an immediate decision.
Q: Witness, how were these experiments actually carried out? What events were decisive?
A: I expressly pointed out what enormous problems existed and what men had influence on Himmler at that time. I was only the one who had to give the clinical direction. It is important that that was the reason — and the experiments would probably have been conducted without me with a clear order from Himmler to Grawitz through same concentration camp doctor. That was between, the 22nd and 25th of May probably.
And on the 27th of May there was the attack on Heydrich. It was nothing out of the ordinary that I was called there. I was always lent out as a surgeon when any special surgical events occurred.
Q: Now, witness, who was Heydrich?
A: Heydrich was the Chief of the RSHA — the Reich Security Main office, at the time, and, in my opinion, he was much closer to Hitler than Himmler. He was the decisive active man of the whole counter-Intelligence, espionage, enemy propaganda, and security within Germany.
Q: Heydrich was SS Obergruppenfuehrer?
A: Yes, until he was shot in Prague, I was called, as I had been called to many other cases of accidents. I came too late, by plane. The operation was performed by two important Prague surgeons and I had to control the course of the treatment. In view of the great tension and nervousness which existed, Hitler and Himmler called up by telephone every day for information and there were an enormous number of suggestions. Two were given me almost in the form of orders, to call my teacher, Geheimrat Sauerbruch in or the Fuehrer's doctor, Dr. Morell, who wanted to use his own methods. I did not hesitate to take the responsibility and I took up a clear point of view. The two Prague surgeons had performed the operation. The shot had torn up the abdomen and the chest. They had done everything that was necessary — they operated efficiently and they also used sulfonamides. I am of the opinion that if anything can endanger a patient it is nervousness by the bedside and the appearance of too many doctors. On precise inquiry I refused to call in another doctor, even Sauerbruch or Morell. Then Heydrich died after two weeks or so and I had to settle the details. You can imagine the situation at the time. Hitler called me in and then refused to receive me. He sent me to Himmler. The discussion with Himmler was very simple. He made it clear to me that Hitler's point of view was that Heydrich was a losing battle such as we had never experienced before; and the remark of Dr. Morell— it isn't that Morell said anything bout experiments — he just skillfully said, "If my" (that is, Morell's)"modern sulfonamides had been administered," (for which Morell had approval, I believe, in Vienna and Hungary to produce it in his own factories) "then maybe things would have been different." In any case the discussion was very brief. The experiments which had already been discussed beforehand were, for fantastic reasons, to be started immediately under Grawitz, and not only the preparations— the Swiss and the German ones which had been intended to be used—but also Morell's ultraseptyl was to be tested. I myself was to give clinical evidence of my treatment and be dependent on the results of the sulfonamide experiments. My teacher, Sauerbruch took my part. He said that nothing had been overlooked and we could not comment on ultraseptyl because we had no experience with it. Grawitz had already received the order and I could only contact Grawitz on the influence which I had voluntarily chosen, that the experiment should not be conducted by an internist or by some unknown concentration camp doctor but that it should be done in such a way that the responsibility could be taken for it at any time afterwards, that the head of the State was the supreme executive in Germany and that he had given the order.
The discussion between Grawitz and me took place but I should make it quite clear here what I discussed with Grawitz. Even today I believe that I acted correctly in the situation. Grawitz consoled me for being in disfavor and said he would do everything so that it would turn out well and that it appeared to him, Grawitz, that I was right in the case of Heydrich; he could not have been saved and there was no evidence in favor of any drugs of Dr. Morell.
I was not of the opinion that the Reich Physician Grawitz, who had no experience whatever at the front, could assume the right to carry out any experiments which were legally ordered in such a way that they were binding for us at the front. There was an enormous responsibility behind these experiments. How can one have a negative result? They were the directives for hundreds of thousands of German wounded. According to my position and the enormous power which the Prosecution says I had, one thing would have been possible—to say that I was sick or to run away, to pretend that it had nothing to do with me and see how Grawitz made out. That would have been a great disgrace for the consulting surgeon of the Waffen SS if he had such a slight sense of responsibility and had not interfered in the experiments. On the other hand I talked to Grawitz and I wanted to know how such experiment would take place and of course I had enough sense of responsibility, enough decency, to ask "Who are the subjects and how are they chosen whom you, Grawitz, use, on orders?" Grawitz considered this very simple but in the whole conversation I could not bring out who the experimental subjects were and how they were chosen. I can say, under oath, that Grawitz always gave the impression that they were more or less volunteers, real volunteers, condemned persons, and that that was done by the camp somehow. I consider it a point in favor that I made it a condition that if any experiment was conducted which was not based on medical initiative, the course of which was decisive, that then the agency issuing the order must clearly determine the group of persons, and the method of selection; that I thought at the time, sufficient, in view of the legal might behind Himmler and Hitler and that they would take the responsibility.
Of course, one thing was not possible—that this decision should be made in the camp. I will later have an opportunity to explain this in detail.
I told Grawitz, "This is an experiment which is conducted without me. Yes, this is an experiment which is not done on medical initiative but which Himmler, that is Hitler, through Himmler, has ordered in July, 1942. Then, Mr. Grawitz, let us both go to Himmler, our supreme commander, and ask him to pick out the people to take the responsibility before the world and assure me that I, as a consulting physician, will have nothing to do with the selection." That they could only be persons condemned to death, that was not clear. I told Grawitz repeatedly that it was not clear how he could do it with volunteers. I will comment later in detail on this question of volunteers for large scale experiments from all the experiments which I know about. Here I shall only say in advance that in a concentration camp of course it is possible for 10 or 15 to volunteer and possibly more under pressure, under influence by being promised certain advantages without any knowledge of the importance of the decision. That was the prerequisite, that this danger of the juridical decision be shown to Himmler, and I may remind you that you have no document about the sulfonamide experiments that does not say "Inquire of Nebe or Mueller." That was the highest decision to be obtained juridically in this field. But I may also claim that after my interference these two names never again appear in the documents. I pointed out this impossible juridical situation. I never appropriated it. I was of the childish opinion that in a totalitarian State, where the authority says "I am the Court, I decide," that it then bears the responsibility.
The second important question was the matter of secrecy. I may point out that until my experiment, no experiment was publicly reported on. That was at Himmler's suggestion because he connected it with his whole tactics of secrecy around the concentration camps. On that point I made my opinion prevail. I beat Himmler with his own evidence. Himmler said "How can you take the responsibility as doctors? You are only the instruments. We, the State, Hitler and Himmler, we the two chief ones, your commanding officers in the SS, order this.
We take the responsibility and we assure you that you are free from punishment." It was as legal as anything could be legal in the Third Reich. I said then, "I do not understand that you keep it secret. If an experiment is to have any scientific value it must be examined by the mass of experienced doctors at a congress, and must be tested at hundreds of clinics, and must become a well known term internationally, and so must acquire its moral value. It must do useful service to the broad mass of humanity."
In spite of all objection of the RSHA I insisted on this point, but when it comes to my report I shall tell what difficulties I had. But I may point out that the concept of giving it to the public was introduced by me, and that I do not believe that the prosecution can prove that since that day I have kept my name away and tried to keep my name away from the sulfanilamide experiments.
Now, I will come to the two concepts which only within the order and within the criticism of the Courts, are purely at the expense of the executing doctor. Here is the base of possibilities and here I agree with the prosecution for the full responsibility, that is the scientific regulation of the experiments set it for thought as thoroughly to the end. Second, the human urge to save lives. That is, that the executing physician at the moment, when for the sake of a scientific experiment, he has to count on certain death, considers security measures before scientific considerations. I hope that this explanation can be found in a document, yet the prosecution will not bring the document in my favor, only the others. Himmler had this document with these words which I have just quoted. Then on the 6th and the 7th we went to see Himmler. I demanded by telephone, what had never happened before, that the inspector of the concentration camp, Gluecks, should be present.
Q: Just a minute, Witness. You said on the 6th and 7th, that was June?
A: June, that was June? No, July, 1942. Up to that time everything had been done through the cap. I do not understand from the Brandt notes that Grawitz was not mentioned because as far as I knew Grawitz was there at the discussion on the 6th. At any case, I talked to Himmler, Grawitz and Gluetz, the inspector of the concentration camp, and I again reported my point of view as I have explained it here, and as a clear distinction I said it was not on my initiative, and I had no intention of conducting any such experiment, that I could not let Grawitz carry out the experiment alone. That was not basic research. That is not a bacteriological problem. That is for the front clinical men and old clinical men. If that experiment is conducted it will be under my protection and my responsibility, and I will take the responsibility, and then on the first opportunity we will go to the broad mass of doctors and acknowledge what the State has ordered and what the responsible doctors have done, and to the end of our lives we will subject ourselves to the criticism of the public.
I have remained more or less alone in doing this. Gluecks was not of the opinion that this could be done, because the condition came that I told them one thing is clear, I said the experiment if it begins with my name will be done only on persons condemned for whom the State has taken the responsibility and whom the State gives the opportunity of saving their lives. I did not ask whether Himmler had the right to pronounce a death sentence. You gave discussion as to the legal basis of the Third Reich — for me Himmler was the Chief of execution who could execute thousands of people by a stroke of the pen. His instrument was the authority of the Reich Office, the RSHA. I was forced to take the responsibility by name, and the people condemned to death could, of course, only be German and only men. Up to now by mutual participation if has never been mentioned, although the documents are well known, that the experiment began with 15 men who came over from Sachsenhausen to Ravensbruck that essentially according to the RSHA they were condemned to death, and that they remained alive. I believe my conditions were relatively clear. I disassociated myself completely from the selection. I disassociated myself express from the initiative for the experiment in itself. I do not admit the selection of any arbitrary person should be left to the camp or camp physician. I said the experiments would have to be conducted on German men condemned to death. It was actually done, and they survived the experiment, and the result since this day became known not only in Germany but in Switzerland and England, otherwise it would not have been so simple to condemn my to death. On the other hand the question of scientific execution had the human conduct was my field of responsibility for which I take the responsibility now.
Q: Witness, I shall go back to the discussion after the death of Heydrich, between you and Himmler, is it true that according to the statements which Himmler made it was quite clear that this was the execution of an order which Hitler himself as the head of the State had given?
A: I can say under oath that that was what Himmler told me. I want it to be absolutely correct. I said that I was not received. Hitler always wanted a report when I performed an operation. Himmler told me with the express approval and the wish of the Fuehrer, and the wish of the Fuehrer was a state order. We did not make a discussion of the instruction, whether Lammers had counter-signed it there, but Hitler ordered and Himmler carried it out and Himmler was my commanding officer and I was obligated by the oath which I described yesterday. I said this because I am not a coward. I could have disassociated myself from the experiment. The experiment would have been dead, and one night say the experiment was useless.
Q: In the discussion of July 6, 1942 Gluecks was present?
A: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: At this time the Court will take the noon recess until 1:30.
(Noon recess)