1947-06-23, #4: Doctors' Trial (late afternoon)
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the courtroom will please find their seats. The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: I would like to remind counsel for the Prosecution that it will be extremely advisable to expedite the attendance of any witness that the Prosecution will have in an endeavor to procure somebody who can be heard in case the defense rests their testimony.
The counsel for defendant may proceed.
MR. HARDY: Your Honor, I do not see the defense counsel for Pokorny here, but are the other defense counsel able to tell us how long he anticipates the case of Pokorny will take and whether or not he intends to call any witnesses?
DR. GAWLIK: Mr. President, I cannot say anything for certain, of course, but I do not believe that the defense of the defendant Pokorny will last very long. However, as I say, I cannot be definite on this.
THE PRESIDENT: Of course, I understand that some of the defendants have some further documents to offer.
MR. HARDY: Would it be possible, Your Honor, for the defense counsel this evening to have a meeting and determine how long the remainder of the presentation of defense will take in that they will introduce their other document books. I have acquired several supplemental document books in behalf of the defendant Karl Brandt, Handloser and other defendants — and have them ascertain just how long it will take to then close the defense, before the prosecution will start on rebuttal? I think they can readily ascertain that this evening and report that to us tomorrow.
THE PRESIDENT: If defense counsel can heed that suggestion and discuss that matter amongst themselves and advise the Tribunal in the morning some idea as to the length of time it will require, it will be appreciated.
MR. HARDY: Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: The counsel for defendant may proceed.
BY DR. GAWLIK (Counsel for the defendant Hoven):
Q: Witness, before the recess we were considering the statement made by the late Dr. Ding, Document NO-257, Exhibit 283, page 15 of Book 12. Here Ding describes the killing of four or five prisoners. Let me ask you regarding this, were these also stool pigeons and traitors?
A: Yes.
Q: What was their citizenship?
A: German.
Q: I turn again to your affidavit, Document No. 249, page 5 of Document Book 12. I should like to consider now number 11. What do you have to say about the first sentence? In particular, what did you understand the word "I supervised" to mean?
A: I understood this to mean that I had knowledge through the prisoners' committee of the intended killing of these stool pigeons.
Q: How can this, in exact terminology, be explained, the use of the word "supervise"?
A: Here again I didn't know the meaning of the English word, namely, the meaning of the word "supervise".
Q: The president has already pointed out today that you inserted the phrase "at the request of the inmates." What did you mean to say here?
A: When I used the word "inmates" I was referring to the illegal camp administration.
Q: Is it true that this committee of German and foreign inmates decided that these traitors and stool pigeons were to be killed?
A: Yes.
Q: And now, please look at number 12. Here again the word "supervision" occurs. What did you intend to say?
A: The same as I intended in number 11.
Q: Will you please repeat that?
A: I was referring to the illegal camp administration and the committee.
Q: Well, it says here "under my supervision."
A: Yes, it says that this was done with my knowledge.
Q: And why was this erroneous terminology used?
A: Again I didn't know the moaning of the word supervision.
Q: How large was the number of prisoners, or it would be better to say, the traitors and stool pigeons of whose killing you had knowledge?
A: 50 or 60.
Q: There was mention here in this affidavit of 150. What did you have to do with the killing of the remainder?
A: Nothing, nothing at all. I found out about that later.
Q: Who were the people in this remainder?
A: They were without exception stool pigeons.
Q: Then this remainder of 90 or so that were killed without your knowledge, of whose killing you found out subsequently, could you have prevented these killings?
A: No, they had already occurred.
Q: And if you had told the SS camp administration about this, what would have happened?
A: Probably ten times as many would have been killed, innocent persons.
Q: And who would have been killed?
A: Political and foreign prisoners. This would have been used as an excuse to start a new action.
Q: Do you know about the Wolf case?
A: Yes.
Q: Who was Wolf?
A: He was a camp trustee.
Q: Did you bring it about that Wolf was transferred to an out side camp?
Q: No, that was done on the orders of the commander. He was working in closest collaboration with the SS, particularly with the administrative head of the protective custody camp, and he played a lamentable role in two camps. The political German and foreign prisoners were greatly interested in seeing to it that Wolf lost his influential position, because the position as a trustee was one of the most powerful in the camp.
It was indifferent whether he remained in the camp. The goal of the illegal camp administration, and my goal also was that a trustee who represented the interests of the prisoners should take his place; and with my assistance this was brought about. His successor was a political prisoner by the name of Reschke, if I remember correctly, (spelling) R-e-s-c-h-k-e. Moreover, contrary to what Kogon said, Wolf did not die in the outlying camp. That was simply a camp rumor; so far as I know he is under indictment in the Buchenwald trial.
Q: Kogon has testified on page 1204 of the English Transcript that Dr. Hoven left the prisoners alone, and if members of the illegal camp administration were pointed out to him, that such and such a person was a traitor he did away with him, is that true?
A: No, it is not.
Q: What was the actual situation?
A: The members of the illegal camp administration particularly the prisoners' committee to which specially selected foreign prisoners belonged, were not known to every prisoner; if they had been known, they wouldn't have lasted long. In this testimony of Kogon's, he puts the members of the illegal committee in a position that throws an altogether false light on the nature of the illegal camp administration. The members of the illegal camp administration to which foreigners also belonged, were the core of the resistance movement against the SS in the camp of Buchenwald. Throughout all those years they bore the main brunt of the struggle to preserve the lives of the inmates. The members of this committee daily risked their lives for the welfare of the other prisoners.
I know many of them who lost their lives in their fight for their commrads; but someone else always took their place. These sacrifices one urged the prisoners again and again to hold out, it supported them and helped them in every respect. If any of those prisoners could be saved who otherwise would have irrevocably been lost, then that we mainly the accomplishment of the members of the illegal camp administration. At my time, Kogon did not participate in this struggle for the welfare of the prisoners. Therefore, so far as this testimony of his is concerned, he cannot testify to anything of his own knowledge. Also, members of the illegal camp administration applied to me on Kogon's behalf, so that he too indirectly owes his life to that committee. In his testimony, he describes it as if I took a walk through the camp with the members of the illegal camp administration and the informers were pointed out to me, And then I immediately had them done away with. But the situation was rather as follows: I have already said before, the illegal camp administration and the committee and the foreign liaison men conducted very careful investigations of two individual informers, and only when it was unequivocally proved that the informers were getting their orders from the SS or from the SS camp administration, then their fate was discussed by the committee. And only if it was unavoidably necessary, and if no other means were at hand, then they were killed. On the other hand, it really would be more appropriate to explain that in view of the situation in the camp at that time they waited too long, because this terrible terror that the stool pigeons set loose in the camp really had to be brought to an end.
Q: Do you know the Gabrellowicz case?
A: I don't really remember the name but now I know what you are talking about.
Q: Roemhild testified that you seriously mistreated Gabrellowicz and that he died shortly thereafter. That is page 1640 of the English transcript.
A: That is not true. Roemhild is imagining things.
Q: What was the real situation?
A: Gabrellowicz was a polish informer working with the SS. I remember still that Gabrellowicz was in Italy and played a role in the Fascist party there. For some reason or other that I don't know today he went to Buchenwald. Many prison members of the illegal camp administration, particularly foreign prisoners, charged Gabrellowicz with being an informer, and it was particularly the liaison men among the Poles who represented that point of view. In the course of this discussion I left the room because I had been called for. Therefore, I cannot tell you of my own direct knowledge what happened, but that the discussion came to results I can well believe, but that he was so badly mishandled that he died of it, that I will never believe, and certainly he was never so mishandled in my office.
Q: Where was the killing of the informers or stool pigeons carried out?
A: In operating room No. 2.
Q: On page 1209 of the English transcript Kogon testified that the prison hospital was the execution chamber of the illegal camp administration. What do you have to say about that?
A: That is so, but Roemhild also said in this connection that it was only to be attributed to the activities of the illegal camp administration and the committee of foreign prisoners that at the end of the war the Americans were able to free 23,000 people who were still alive. Moreover, I should like to emphasize at this time that these informers and stool pigeons would have met death even if the prison hospital had not been the execution chamber, and that otherwise it would have cost the lives of many valuable human beings.
However, the way in which the informers were killed would have been slow and painful, because if there had been no other way they simply would have been beaten to death by the prisoners.
Q: Were only such people killed as the illegal camp administration designated as informers or stool pigeons, and did this happen without exception?
A: You would not say designated as informers. If the results of the investigation carried on by the illegal camp administration and the committee showed that the informer was a potential danger for the whole camp and if it were decided to kill this man, then this killing was carried out with my permission and my assistance.
DR. GAWLIK: Mr. President, to substantiate the witness's statement I put in Hoven Document No. 18, which will be Exhibit No. 8. That is in the supplementary volume, the affidavit of the Dutch Town Councillor from Amsterdam, Leendert Seegers. Let me direct your particular attention to No. 12. Seegers here states:
I know that Dr. Hoven only killed those of the prisoners systematically who had to be looked upon as SS and Gestapo spies or as dangerous collaborators within the camp.
Regarding the character of the affiant, let me call your attention to No. 1, also Nos. 2, 3, and 4. From this it can be seen that Seegers was in Buchenwald for three years and consequently has the knowledge necessary for this deposition. In further proof of Seegers' character I put in Hoven Document No. 8. This will be Exhibit No. 9. This is a report of the Dutch Committee concerning the illegal preparations for international anti-fascist cooperation in the camp Buchenwald. This is on page 25. Let me call your attention first to page 32. From this it can be seen that this report is signed by this Seegers among others, and this proves that Seegers was one of the leading personages in the resistance movement in the camp Buchenwald and in the illegal camp administration.
It proves also that Seegers is in a position to judge regarding the necessity of the measures taken. I call your attention further to page 25, the second paragraph, quote:
In order to understand this amazing fact it is necessary to give a short history of the hard and dangerous illegal activity and wearisome preparations.
The members of all the nations represented in the Buchenwald camp took part in these preparations.
On page 26, the next to the last paragraph shows that the SS used professional criminals with many years of previous convictions as the extended arm for their shameful acts, namely, the act of destroying the political prisoners. Just what happened in detail is shown in the last paragraph on page 28; at the top it says:
How many sick prisoners, for example, were hospitalized contrary to the intentions of the SS.
This was Hoven's activity for the welfare of the so-called decent prisoners.
Let me draw your attention to page 28, at the bottom, where it says:
The German and Austrian prisoners who, as already stated, had occupied the most widely varying posts, entered into communication with the Dutch.
This is the same Seegers who signed the affidavit, and the Tribunal will also recall that this Pieck has appeared here as a witness, who also made statements regarding the necessity of those killings.
This again proves that Pieck has the necessary knowledge and that he is a person who can express an opinion in this matter.
Furthermore, on page 29 at the bottom you will find the statement:
The Committee was composed of representatives of the Anti-Revolutionary Party, the Liberal Democrats, the Catholic and Social Democrats, the Communists, and the Independents. In the course of time the following took part in the work of the committee.
And then there are a few names, among them the name of Seegers and the name of Pieck.
On page 30 in the middle it says:
Under the leadership of the German veterans Walter Barth and Harry Kuhn and with the participation of Ernst Busse, representatives of France, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Russia, and the Netherlands took part in this first international discussion. Pieck took part in this work for the Netherlands.
This will clarify Pieck's personality, Pieck being the man I called here as a witness, who can say he played a position in the illegal camp administration. It reads further:
For reasons connected with the conspiracy, only a few men of the committee should be taken into the secret.
This proves that this was a very small circle that could judge the necessity of these killings.
Let me draw the attention of the Tribunal to page 32. The report is signed for the Anti-Revolutionary Party by Dr. D. van Lingen; for the Liberal-Democratic Party by G. Ritmeester; for the Social Democratic Labor Party in the Netherlands by Arie Treurneit; then by Seegers; and for the Catholic Group by J. Robert.
Let me draw your attention now to Pieck's testimony, who said this J. Robert is the same man who was approved as a witness for me but who had a fatal accident —
MR. HARDY: May I ask, your Honors, what defense counsel purports this to be?
DR. GAWLIK: This, as you can see from the title, is the report by the Netherlands Committee on the illegal preparations for international anti-fascist cooperation in the Camp Buchenwald.
MR. HARDY: Where is the original?
DR. GAWLIK: In Holland. Pieck brought the report with him, and I had the General Secretary prepare this copy.
MR. HARDY: May I see the copy, please? Then this copy in German certified by Captain Rice purports to be the copy of the original brought by Dr. Pieck?
DR. GAWLIK: The Secretary General has certified it. Pieck brought it along. Pieck had to take it back with him, so I sent Pieck to the Secretary General.
MR. HARDY: Is this Captain Rice familiar with the German language?
DR. GAWLIK: I assume so. He is a translator. I didn't worry about that. I just gave it to him in the defense counsel's office.
MR. HARDY: I don't know who this man Rice is, your Honor. I have no objection to it. I would like to know who Captain Rice is of the Secretary General's office. I never heard of him.
DR. GAWLIK: Correction. Rice is in the Defense Counsel's room upstairs.
THE PRESIDENT: I notice the copy in the Tribunal's Document Book is certified by defense counsel Dr. Gawlik.
MR. HARDY: The original is, however, in order. Each page is certified by Captain Rice. I was just inquiring as to the background of the document.
THE PRESIDENT: Counsel may proceed.
BY DR. GAWLIK:
Q: On page 1209 of the English record Kogon testified that Hoven worked in closest collaboration with political prisoners. What do you have to say about that?
A: That is correct. I worked very closely with the German and foreign political prisoners. I also worked with the decent prisoners who wore the green triangle and were classified by the SS as professional criminals. It would be more correct to say I collaborated with all prisoners, no matter what category the SS had put them in. It was entirely indifferent to me what their previous profession had been, whether cultural or workers. I must say that in the majority of cases of the prisoners I saved I didn't know who the man was. This was the reason why, as Dr. Horn said, there were prisoners in those transports I kept from leaving who represented all professions, from Minister of State down to proletariat.
Q: Was there no way of doing away with traitors and stool pigeons?
A: If you had ever been in a concentration camp and knew the actual conditions there, you wouldn't ask that question. What was I to do? Should I go to the SS administration? Should I go to Koch or Lolling? To Gluecks, to Himmler, or to his Gestapo agent, Dr. Morgen, who on Himmler's orders was carrying out exterminations in the camp? And should I tell one of these people "Kuschnarev, or one of these informers you have employed, has killed hundreds of prisoners, turned Russian commissars over for extermination and let the Jews be beaten to death?" They would have told me I was crazy or more probably they would have simply shot me, and no one would have been helped by that and nothing would have been changed, because the highest representatives of justice in the camp were also at the same time the main representatives of the extermination program in the camp.
Nor should it be forgotten, and I should like to emphasize again now, that a political prisoner, whether German or foreign, was considered in the concentration camp to be the worst criminal, and his extermination from the point of view of the SS was a good deed.
Q: In this connection I should like to draw the attention of the Tribunal again to Seegers' affidavit, namely No. 13. This is document No. 18 in the Supplemental Volume. No. 13, which reads:
Conditions in Buchenwald, where there was practically a state of War between inmates and SS, permitted of no other alternative, in my opinion.
No. 14. These killings, as far as I know, were an absolute necessity for the growing organization of political prisoners in Buchenwald, which made of Buchenwald a camp which distinguished itself favorably from all other existing camps in Germany. It is safe to assume in this respect that Dr. Hoven just by this killing assisted consciously in saving the lives of thousands in Buchenwald.
No. 15. Here Seegers says there was no other possibility of doing away with informers, and he says at the end:
To continue to exist would have meant certain death for the illegal prisoner's organization in Buchenwald and for the leading prisoners and would have led to a catastrophe for the entire camp.
I further put in this connection the affidavit by Philip Dirk. This is document No. 13, which will be Exhibit 10, page 45 to 48 in No. 13. Philip Dirk, Baron van Pallandt van Erde, says in No. 13, the question is:
What do you think about the necessity of these killings?
They were probably very necessary.
Has each killing saved the life of many times the number of prisoners?
Very probably.
Under the existing conditions at the time at the Concentration Camp Buchenwald, was there any other way to render harmless these SS and Gestapo spies?
So far as I know, no.
Regarding the affiant's character, I draw the Tribunal's attention to No. 1. This man is not a German who is making this statement to help a former camp doctor in Buchenwald. This man is a Dutchman. Let me draw your particular attention to the fact that he himself says:
I am chiefly interested in international and humanitarian movements.
In view of this, the statements made in questions 13 to 15 by this affiant should be of particular probative value. He also says under No. 1:
Since 1935 I have a school for Quakers in my manor. After the war I received an official recognition of gratitude from the USA for having concealed a US airman for seven months, during the war.
Nos. 2, 3 and 4 show that he was in Buchenwald as a prisoner.
I shall further put in evidence the affidavit of Adolf Andre Hummel. This is Document No. 12 and Exhibit No. 12, page 40.
THE PRESIDENT: Is not that exhibit number 11, counsel?
BY DR. GAWLIK:
Q: Correction, yes it is 11.
As can be seen from Page 40, this is a former political prisoner in Buchenwald who, on pages 41 and 42, makes statements regarding the killings. At the bottom of page 41:
I know that prisoners have been killed with the knowledge of Dr. Hoven. It concerned without exception SS and Gestapo spies. The killing of each one of these saved the life of a vast number of prisoners. The killing of every one of these persons was necessary in order to save the lives of decent prisoners.
Then he speaks of the Kuschnir Kuschnarev case, which is well known to us by now.
Why did you yourself carry out the killings? Why didn't you leave it up to the illegal camp administration in all cases?
A: Here again I must give you the same answer that an officer would give, after a battle, to the question "Why did you shoot at the enemy? Why didn't you leave that up to your soldiers exclusively?". There were cases where I had to act, cases that I could not turn over to the prisoners. I can prove that by the case of Kuschnir Kuschnarev, although I might choose other examples. I chose the Kuschnarev case because the facts in this case have already been testified to by the Prosecution witness Kogon. The powerful position that Kuschnarev occupied and his connections with the Gestapo and SS, which extended as far up as the RSHA, I have already described. The committee of political prisoners was persuaded that Kuschnarev's activities were meeting with success. He did his business perfectly openly. For more than a year his death had been decided upon, but no one dared to carry out the sentence, because Kuschnir Kuschnarev lived in a room which was guarded by the SS. Prisoners could have been found who would have sacrificed their own lives in order to kill Kuschnir Kuschnarev, but that would have had evil consequences also.
That would have led to an action against the political German and foreign prisoners and the Jewish prisoners. Kuschnarev's anti-Semitism was greater than that even of the camp administration, the SS. The number of Jews that he had executed on false charges runs into the hundreds. Consequently, it was only with my assistance that killing him was possible, and this was a case where only I could do the killing. I also knew in this case that I had to risk all. Everyone who approached the Kuschnarev problem was risking his life, but, of course, I had the best chances of success. The most prominent members of the prisoner committee were present when I told them of my decision to carry out this killing and, though I knew that killing was the only possible solution, it was very difficult for me to do so. I alleged that Kuschnarev died of typhoid. There are terrible notions that even today a person shies away from — namely, the situation in the Camp Buchenwald at that time. He knows of them only if he sees them not from the periphery of the camp, but personally experiences them himself.
Q: How did you reconcile these acts with your position as a doctor?
A: These acts have nothing at all to do with my position as a doctor. I should have acted in exactly the same way if I had not been a doctor. My struggle was against the conditions that prevailed, and my position in this fight was prescribed for me once I had put myself on the side of the prisoners. To the committee there belonged, among others, men of the same profession as mine, who would have acted in the same way as I did and had to act in the same way.
Q: Kogon said, on page 1209 of the English transcript, and I quote:
If it was a case of saving political prisoners who were in danger of their lives by withdrawing them from the political department, then Dr. Hoven was always ready to give his signature for such an action once the suggestion was made to him.
Is that correct?
A: Yes, but it is not complete. I did not pay any attention to what category the prisoner I was to save fell under. It was enough for me that he was no traitor or informer. Therefore, since I could not know each prisoner personally, it was sufficient for me if he was proposed by the agents of the illegal camp administration or the German or foreign political prisoners, because these agents were the deputies of the individual resistance groups in the camp. The classification as "green" or "red" or as Jew or Aryan was made by the SS, and for me it had no binding validity.
Q: From what date on did you work with the illegal camp administration and the political committee?
A: Shortly after I began my activities as second camp doctor at the beginning of 1941.
Q: Kogon said the following in this matter:
From the time when Dr. Hoven worked as the camp doctor he collaborated with the illegal camp administration.
Is that correct?
A: Yes, but again it is not complete because, as I said, I didn't work only with the illegal camp administration, but also with the foreign prisoners and with the Jews.
Q: Regarding the time at which the defendant worked in collaboration with the illegal camp administration, I draw your attention to Document No. 13, Exhibit 10. This is the affidavit by Philip Dirk. It can be seen that he was released on 20 March 1941, and he writes, under #7:
My wife had learned in Holland that one could obtain a release through Dr. Hoven.
Please observe the date, 20 March 1941. This was before the war between Russia and Germany had begun. Even at that time Dr. Hoven was known in Holland as a person who saved prisoners in Buchenwald.
How did it happen that you collaborated with the illegal camp administration?
A: The prisoners with whom I came into close contact, namely Walter Kraemer whom I have already named today — he was a former Reichstag [Parliament] Deputy — and other members of the illegal camp administration soon saw that I was different from my predecessors. From him and from foreign prisoners and the aforementioned four Jewish prisoners particularly I found out about the real conditions in the camp. This made such an impression on me that I allied myself with them.
Q: Roemhild said, on page 1658 of the English transcript, that in November or December you saved a transport of about 400 political prisoners. Is that so, and who were these prisoners?
A: That is so. These were prisoners who were to be killed within the framework of the Nacht und Nebel [Night and Fog] Action. In the case of the French prisoners, as usual, the most prominent prisoners were chosen for this action. In 1942 and 1943 the Dutch would all, without exception, be sent to Natzweiler which, toward the end of 1942, had become quite definitely an extermination camp. I found out that Natzweiler had this reputation at the end of 1942. I found out from Dutch and French prisoners who had come from Natzweiler to Buchenwald. There were two or three prisoners. To prevent these transports from leaving, I followed the same plan every time, a plan which worked. I was informed in good time how the transport was to be made up. The illegal camp administration told me this. Then I removed most of the prisoners from the transport and said that for one reason or another they were unfit for travel, being sick. Those in particular danger, namely those who had played a political role in their home countries, were designated by me as convalescents or they were put in the hospital as patients or were used as skilled laborers in the Gustloff works.
Let me interpolate at this time that I was asked occasionally whether I only rescued prominent prisoners or whether I also rescued others. In the meantime it has become known what the situation was.
But the reason why I made the acquaintance primarily of prominent prisoners — namely people who, in their private lives, occupied leading positions in their own countries — is that they were in particular danger.
They were known to the Gestapo and the SS, and they were more persecuted than a prisoner who hadn't played any particular role in his own country. This was the reason why is was particularly these prisoners whose acquaintance I made, because they were in the greatest danger. My saving of these prisoners whom Roemhild mentioned could only be done with the help of particularly reliable prisoners. This was Gottschalk in 1942 for the French and Schittenhelm, and a Jewish prisoner, August Cohn, one of the greatest altruists that Buchenwald ever saw. For the Dutch the Jan Robert and Henry Pieck, and I must emphasize that these two men endangered their lives daily in carrying on the activities that they did in 1943. Another transport of Dutch and French was to leave. It was prevented from leaving in the same way. There was likewise a large transport of Jewish prisoners. So far as the Dutch are concerned, all the prisoners were liberated by the American Army in 1945, with the exception of those who did not survive this action of 1942 and 1943. Since other prisoners were accommodated in Block 50 and in the Gustloff works, they were designated as essential and were never caught up in the Nacht und Nebel transports.
Q: For what reasons did you help the prisoners? It has been said here that you had motives of corruption.
A: That would have been an expensive affair for me to engage in, if I had to pay with my life for any material advantages I was trying to acquire. These assertions are incorrect. I believe it was Dr. Kogon who made that statement here. I do not say that Kogon is deliberately lying, but for a person who is not on the inside — and Kogon was such a person because he was not a member of the illegal committee or illegal camp administration — as I say, for a person who is not on the inside it might appear that I was helping the prisoners for corrupt reasons, That however, was by no means the case. I derived advantages personally from the prisoners. Moreover, I had no need of help from them, because I had money in my own right, and did not need the prisoners help. All the people who were pointed out to me by the foreign committee and the illegal camp administration and whom I thought worthy of help, all these people I helped with no regard for what they had to offer, and after all, what could a prisoner in a concentration camp offer.
Most of them were without property, if they had formerly had property it had already been seized by the Gestapo. This was particularly true of the non-German prisoners. To be sure, in order to help the prisoners I had to bribe the Gestapo political department, the adjutant's office, the leading doctors in Berlin, and the offices of the RSHA. They assisted me, and in this way it was possible to help the prisoners, for example to obtain releases to prevent the execution of penalties, etc. According to the regulations it was forbidden to recommend any releases. In order to have the necessary funds for this bribing, I set up the illegal workshop in Block 46, and I set it up specifically in Block 46 because there was no danger that the workshop would be discovered. Moreover, I could use particularly endangered prisoners as workers in the workshop and thus protect them. It is of no importance, but, I would like to say it here that the suggestion that these illegal workshops be set up was not mine. The prisoners made the suggestion tome, and it was a good one. Not only did I not receive anything from the prisoners I helped, but I supported them for the first period after their release. I gave them clothing, shoes and food, and even provided for their relatives in some cases. This was however, only possible by my sending packages to my wife who sent them on under another name. Not only for prisoners who were released but also for prisoners in the camp itself, and their relatives, I sent clothing and shoes manufactured in the illegal workshops.
Q: Kogon also said that the prisoners gave you presents, pictures, clothing etc., whatever you wanted, is that so?
A: If Kogon is referring to the clothing manufactured in the illegal workshop that is correct, but they could't give them to me, because I was the director of these workshops, and I wouldn't bribe myself. No, I did not receive these things for my personal use, but as I said, I had them manufactured for the purpose of bribery in the interest of the prisoners themselves.
I wouldn't be speaking of these unimportant matters now, I am not under indictment for that, but I would like to say I am able to say oven today where I got my suits of clothes I wore in Buchenwald. They were made by Pool in London, Terkelsen made part of them. Lelong in Paris made some of them. Never in my life have I worn silk shirts, but I didn't have my shirts made in Buchenwald. I had enough of them. I got from a shop d'Aheze. As I have said I came to Buchenwald with eight suits of clothing. They were in very good condition, because as everyone knows English material is very good, and I gave them all away to prisoners, prisoners who had been released. If it were necessary I produce affidavits to show you.
Q: Did you receive presents from the prisoners?
A: Yes, it is true that I received presents from the prisoners, but these were only presents given me in gratitude, and of no particular value. A person who knows the setup in Buchenwald particularly my collaboration with the illegal camp administration and the committee of political prisoners, will understand that the prisoners made efforts to manifest their gratitude, and I could not have brought myself to refuse to accept such a present, because that would have hurt the donors feelings. These were such things as ashtrays, needlework, etc., and I again gave these presents to other people. I think during my time in Buchenwald I collected something like 180 ashtrays, but I have none of them left today. I gave them all away. It is true that Pieck painted my portrait, and also that of my family, but that has nothing to do with corruption. Pieck who was a member of the illegal camp administration, I helped before I knew what his profession was. Then Horn said the only way Pieck could be used was as a painter. Horn correctly stated that we couldn't even use him to keep the fever charts. Moreover Pieck painted in all his spare time with great pleasure. He had that privilege, and I believe that I did Pieck a favor as a painter, inasmuch as I gave him an opportunity to pursue his profession.
Q: On page 1204 of the English transcript Kogon called you primarily a man who liked to live a comfortable life; is that so?
A: I don't know what could have given Kogon that opinion. Kogon cannot judge this because he never worked with me in the hospital. These can only be unfounded rumors which small minds let loose in the world. Because I lived in foreign countries and lived two years in Paris, many people have concluded that I like to live a luxurious life because I have different opinions on matters than other people do. At any rate, this much is true, whatever I had the prisoners also had, at least my nurses did. I often ate with my nurses and now and then drank a glass of wine or brandy with them, but my activities for the prisoners meant that not one day of my life was safe. Because Kogon knew this, I do not understand why he made the statements that he did.
Q: When did you learn about the real circumstances and conditions at Buchenwald?
A: Right at the beginning of my activities. I have already said that through German, foreign, and Jewish prisoners, I was informed of the true conditions in the camp. It is perhaps well that I had no political persuasions, because in this way I was not attached to any one group in particular and could take the interests of all into consideration. It then became known that is what I thought.
At the beginning of my activities, as I have already said, Buchenwald was under the control of a certain category of habitual criminals and informers who were continuously in disharmony with the SS and Gestapo. It is not correct to believe that all the prisoners wearing the green triangle were habitual criminals. The majority of them had received previous penalties for minor crimes — mostly they were skilled laborers, and that was one of the main reasons why Himmler, as chief of the German Police, started the habitual criminal actions, in order that he might have available a supply of skilled laborers. These prisoners were sharply differentiated from the group of habitual criminals who worked with the SS and were sharply opposed by them.
They gave great support to me in my struggle against the professional criminals who were cooperating with the SS. I helped these men just the way I helped the political German and foreign prisoners. With the help of this specialized category of professional criminals, most of whom had committed crimes before Hitler's time and were locked up for it, the traitors and informers tried to exterminate the German and foreign political prisoners and also the Jews.
I assert that without this system of informers, the concentration camps would not have become what we later learned they were. They were those who gave the concentration camps their characteristic features. This I know from conversations with inmates, who were much more clever and intelligent than myself and who had much more experience in life than I had. They told me that scientists, judges, ministers, high state official, priests, artists and authors, in short everyone who were the red triangle and because some who wore the green triangle were in no way professional criminals they were forced to live in the company of persons whom every civilized state would have kept behind bars and isolated. This led to conditions in the camp which only a person who actually experienced them can correctly evaluate. Men who had been the back-bone of society and of the state in their countries, suddenly found themselves crowded together in narrow confinement surrounded by sadistic criminals, criminals who worked in collaboration with the most inferior members of the SS, namely these concentration camp SS men, a negative selection from the Waffen SS, whom the Waffen SS itself had rejected. These political prisoners, to give them a collective name, in this state of terrible necessity formed their own laws in order to save themselves. The executive power was put in the hands of a few selected men with whom I again collaborated. To these alone must thanks be given that the rule of the informers and traitors in Buchenwald was broken.
Despite the fact that conditions in Buchenwald were still bad enough, nevertheless the political prisoners did succeed in saving the lives of thousands of valuable persons. In this murderous struggle between SS and informers on the one hand and the German and foreigner political prisoners on the other, the means according to which this fight was to be conducted were prescribed to the latter in advance, so to speak. In addition to this activity of the SS in using professional criminals, there was the system of Capos, block trustees, and foremen. I must point out an error which is associated with the word capo, which I noticed in the course of the examination. The opinion is apparently still prevalent that a Capo had to collaborate with the informers and the SS, but that is incorrect. The leader of a work commando was always called the Capo. The struggle of the illegal camp administration directed toward getting as many of their men into the position of Capo as possible; this could be done only if the SS did not know the orientation of this Capo. I and the illegal camp management always endeavored to get these men an appointment for the job of Capo. This was not always easy, because the Capo's power was considerable, and the SS, of course, wanted only the persons it approved of to occupy this position. Unfortunately, by the middle of 1942 most of the positions of Capo were occupied by these malodorous professional criminals and informers but we finally succeeded in eliminating most of them. I know many Capos who did the most prodigious and amazing things for their comrades in order to alleviate their fate. Many belonged to the underground or illegal camp administration. If the Capos belonged to the above-mentioned category of professional criminals used by the SS in order systematically to exterminate the Jews and political prisoners, then their activities led in great measure to the concentration camps becoming an extermination camp for political prisoners and Jews.
Q: Who ordered the release of prisoners?
A: The R.S.H.A.
Q: What were the prerequisites for a prisoner's release from a concentration camp?
A: Theoretically the following conditions had to be met: working had to have been well done, the orientation had to be National Socialist, conduct had to be good, but practically speaking it was almost impossible to be released from a concentration camp. I believe there was one amnesty otherwise it was almost impossible, although the submission of the conduct reports which the R.S.H.A. prescribed could have made release possible. The prisoner, after serving his sentence in prison, was sent to the concentration camp. It was prescribed that after a quarter of a year a conduct report was to be prepared by the camp commander. The Gestapo office that had sent in the prisoner ordered this conduct report to be prepared by the camp commander. He passed the order on to the head of the protective custody camp, who was to draw up this report on the basis of the prisoner's behavior, work, and accomplishments. For this, of course, it was necessary for him to make inquiries and he gave the subordinate office this job. The subordinate office was called a Rapportfuehrer — the assistant administrative head of the protective custody camp — he was a non-commissioned officer. This man in turn went to the so-called block leaders, who were members of the SS who had charge of one or two blocks in which the prisoners were housed. These block leaders turned to the block trustees. The block trustee was a prisoner. Thus it can be understood what enormous power the block trustee had in his hands. Then the information obtained by the block leader was to go back through the same channels to the assistant administrative head, then the administrator of the protective custody camp who was supposed to call the prisoners in and on the basis of this report and on previous reports he would form an opinion whether the prisoner should be released.
That would have been the correct procedure, but of course it was never followed. This I know from personal experience; an altogether primitive thing was the reason for this. The administrative heads of the protective custody camps were altogether simple, primitive people and had an education so slight you would be surprised to hear it. In the camp of Buchenwald the administrative head of the protective camp had the rank of a Major, but in the Waffen SS he would not have had the rank of a corporal. I know this because I was requested to appear by one of these administrative heads in the matter of one of those conduct reports and we talked it over. When the prisoner entered, he took up the documents beginning with the statement of why he had been sentenced to the concentration camp. His previous arrest was also listed there, and the reason for his confinement was a political one. These documents were read through and the sentences that the prisoner had already served for a long time. He then had an attack of rage, hit him and threw him out. The up-shot of this was that the prisoners were afraid to report so that their conduct reports could be gone over, depending on the administrative heat'd mood. The consequence were that the documents that he had not looked at for months and years, he took another look at and said, "this man is another political crook, an opponent of National Socialism", and so the prisoner who previously might have been in an easy condition suddenly found himself in the quarry. The final result was that it might cost him his life to turn up for one of these conduct examinations. That is the whole insight into these conduct reports.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will be in recess until 9:30 o'clock tomorrow morning.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal will be in recess until 9:30 o'clock tomorrow morning.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 24 June 1947 at 0930 hours.)